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CASE STUDIES AND THE CLASSROOM: ENRICHING THE 
STUDY OF LAW THROUGH REAL CLIENT STORIES 
 
Michael Millemann* 
 
I. EARLY LIFE 
 
To institute the narrative component of this Journal, the editors 
asked me to write about what I have done as a lawyer in forty-three 
years of law practice.
1
 Initially, I thought I would decline. Such per-
sonal reflections, not to put too fine a point on it, usually are obnox-
ious. At best, they are suspect because they are based on first-hand ac-
counts.
2
  
When I told my son about the Journal’s request, and that I 
would decline it, he said, “that would be a mistake; you should just tell 
the stories you told me growing up, the events as you witnessed them.” 
Okay, I thought, this provides a vantage point that is not narcissist, or 
at least not wholly so, as a lawyer-witness to events that were im-
portant to clients and as parts of movements that were more broadly 
important in the country.   
When I thought about it some more, I realized I have additional 
vantage points, as a clinical and classroom teacher, as well as a lawyer. 
Although I was counsel in many major cases before I began teaching,
3
 
                                                          
* Jacob A. France Professor of Public Interest Law, University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law. I deeply appreciate the extremely helpful 
editorial suggestions of Professors Richard Boldt, Lee Kovarsky, and Sheldon 
Krantz, as well as the excellent research assistance of Ian Anthony and Matthew 
Gorman. I also appreciate the patience and essential editorial assistance of the 
Journal staff, particularly Ameet Sarpatwari, Chelsea Jones, Amber Hendrick, and 
Mayer Kovacs. 
1
 I graduated from Dartmouth College in 1966 and Georgetown University 
Law Center in 1969, and began practicing at the National Prison Project in Virginia 
and the Baltimore Legal Aid Bureau in 1969.  
2
 Personal histories are notoriously self-aggrandizing and inaccurate. See, e.g., 
Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider 
Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1291 (1995); Jean C. Love, The Value of 
Narrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 87, 89 
(1998).  
3
 Before I began teaching in 1974, I represented prisoners in a variety of civil 
rights class action suits and classes of criminal defendants, welfare recipients, 
juveniles, and mental patients in law reform cases. When I was hired to teach in the 
law school in 1974, I told Dean Cunningham that I felt qualified to teach civil 
procedure, civil rights courses, trial practice courses, evidence, criminal law, and 
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the cases and project that I discuss in this Article were matters that I 
worked on and taught with as a clinical teacher in partnership with 
clinical law students in several different clinics. These included a con-
stitutional law clinic, which I created in 1984 to introduce students to 
major litigation, including capital litigation;
4
 a criminal defense clinic 
in the mid-1980s in which my students and I represented abused wom-
en who had killed their abusers;
5
 and a post-conviction clinic in the 
                                                                                                                                         
criminal procedure. This was before we had multiple clinics; there was only one 
then, the Juvenile Law Clinic, and it was fully staffed. The Dean listened 
respectfully, nodding at all the right times, and at the end of the meeting told me I 
was teaching contracts and that given space problems in the law school building, my 
office would be in the nursing school. We shook hands warmly, and I 
enthusiastically began my teaching career as a contracts teacher from an office in the 
nursing school.     
4
 State v. Fitzpatrick was one of the cases in this clinic. See infra, Part III. I 
had taught clinically with major litigation prior to that. In 1976, my clinical students, 
clinical co-teachers, lawyers from, then, Piper and Marbury, and I, acting through the 
newly created Legal Service Clinic (a partnership project with Piper), represented 
Baltimore City Jail inmates in a federal class action, Duvall v. Lee.  See Duvall v. 
Schaeffer, Civ. A. No. K-76-1255, 1988 WL 228561, at *1, *1 (D. Md. 1988). We 
challenged an array of jail conditions, especially overcrowding, and settled the case 
on terms favorable to the inmates. Id. The Public Justice Center is still working today 
to enforce that and subsequent consent decrees. Health Care and Humane 
Conditions, PUB. JUSTICE CTR., http://www.publicjustice.org/our-work/prisoners-
rights/access-to-health-care-and-humane-conditions (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). The 
major cases in the 1980s Constitutional Law Clinic included not only the Florida 
death penalty case, but also a Maryland death penalty case (we helped persuade 
Governor Harry Hughes to commute the death sentence of Doris Foster to life 
imprisonment); a class action that closed a notorious state juvenile facility; a 
successful lawsuit on behalf of the Frederick County NAACP against the local Ku 
Klux Klan; representation of a patient suffering from end-stage amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis, in a successful effort to give him control of his decision to end his life with 
the removal of a ventilator; a successful damage action on behalf of a State prisoner 
who was brutally beaten by a  Maryland Penitentiary “goon squad;” abused women 
who killed their abusers and were charged with murder, see Thomas W. Waldron, 
Governor: Women Were “Pushed to the Brink,” THE EVENING SUN, Feb. 20 1991 at 
C1; the successful defense of Baltimore City’s tenants’ right-of-first-refusal 
ordinance (giving tenants the first option to buy); and a statewide prisoner class 
action successfully challenging an exhaustion of state remedies requirement in 
federal civil rights cases. See Constitutional Law Clinic Docket (on file with author). 
In 1985, a lawyer-friend and colleague of mine, Nevett Steele, and I created the 
Public Justice Center as an independent non-profit to litigate major civil rights cases, 
which it has done superbly since then. Mission and History, PUB. JUSTICE CTR., 
http://www.publicjustice.org/about/mission-and-history (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
5
 State v. Johnson was one of these cases. See infra Part IV.B.  
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2000s, in which Professor Renee Hutchins and I represented, among 
others, life-sentenced prisoners who, in fact, were innocent.
6
  
I have taught many more students with these cases, in the 
forms of case studies, in a variety of classroom courses, including first 
and second year required courses, seminars, legal theory and practice 
courses, and clinics.
7
 These are what I would call “personal case stud-
ies,” since they are based on cases and projects in which I played sig-
nificant roles. They contain packages of documents; excerpts from 
court opinions; parts of trial transcripts, press clips, and correspond-
ence; other records; and sometimes video-taped interviews of the cli-
ents. I do not use confidential information in these case studies. If 
without that information, a case study would be misleading or inaccu-
rate, I do not use the case to create a case study. Client consent is im-
portant, and there has been a client consent provision in clinic retainer 
agreements that I have used over the years.
8
   
I have written elsewhere about the value of teaching required 
professional responsibility and legal writing courses with ongoing le-
gal work.
9
 This Article gives me the opportunity to evaluate the use of 
personal case studies based on completed cases to teach classroom 
courses. I teach the case studies with a variety of methods, including 
simulations (i.e., teams of students, in role, perform tasks in the case), 
seminar-type discussions (with different assignments to different 
teams of students), the Socratic technique, and story-telling.  
                                                          
6
 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the plight of Walter Arvinger and Mark 
Grant).  
7
 These courses have included criminal law (both large classes and small 
section legal analysis and writing courses), constitutional law, a death penalty 
seminar, and a course called Lawyers and Their Legal Systems and Social Context, 
in which students use actual cases as the bases for plays that they write. See infra 
Part IV.C. 
8
 One of the latest versions states: “You understand that the Law Clinic is both 
a law office and an educational program. You agree that the Law Clinic may (1) 
videotape, audiotape or otherwise record conversations with you and (2) use these 
(and other) materials from your case to supervise and teach law students. The Law 
Clinic, its lawyers and students will protect your privacy and confidentiality. The 
Law Clinic will not disclose any information related to your case in any way that 
injures the attorney/client privilege.” UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. OF 
LAW CLINICAL LAW PROGRAM, CLIENT AGREEMENT 3 (2013) (on file with author).  
9
 See generally David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics 
Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995); Michael A. Millemann 
& Steven D. Schwinn, Teaching Legal Research and Writing with Actual Legal 
Work: Extending Clinical Education Into the First Year, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 441 
(2006).   
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The case studies contain different types of legal stories, told by 
and from the vantage points of a lawyer (Part III), clients speaking for 
themselves (Part IV.A), a client looking back on her case a decade lat-
er (Part IV.B), law students filling in the gaps in actual cases of inno-
cent prisoners with theatrical productions (Part IV.C), and the many 
other actors in these cases and projects, including judges and opposing 
counsel (Part IV.D).  
In Part III of this Article, I focus on a Florida death penalty 
case and the stories from it that I regularly use to teach classes in crim-
inal law and constitutional law courses. In Part IV, I describe other 
cases, case studies, and stories that I regularly teach with. In Part V, I 
describe what I believe to be the educational value, and some of the 
educational challenges, of teaching with personal case studies. I begin, 
however, with my introduction, in the summer of 1967, to the primacy 
in our democracy of the rule of law, to its fragility, and to the heroic 
people who demanded it and fought for it. That summer started me on 
the path that I continue to walk down forty-five years later, albeit at a 
slower pace today.  
  
II. THE SUMMER OF 1967 
 
Some of the stories I teach with derive from the summer of 
1967, when I worked in the civil rights movement in Louisiana. In 
1967, I was an unhappy second semester law student at the University 
of Oregon School of Law. I did not see the relevance of law or lawyers 
to the pressing national issues of the 1960s. I had gone to the Universi-
ty of Oregon from Dartmouth College in reliance on advice from a 
lawyer from my small home town in Oregon, whom I respected. “If 
you want to practice in Oregon,” which I did, or thought I did, “go to a 
State law school,” he said, and “the best of the three is the University.” 
So, I did. I was doing well in law school but was not sure why I was 
there.
10
  
                                                          
10
 The problem was not the first year faculty. I took courses from the three best 
law professors I would ever have, including after I transferred to Georgetown in my 
second year. They were Hans Linde, Robert Summers, and Herbert Titus. Linde 
taught at the law school from 1959–1978, and then served on the Oregon Supreme 
Court from 1977–1990. His state court jurisprudence was important nationally. 
Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael E. Ahrens, The Legacy of Hans Linde in The 
Statutory and Administrative Age, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 175, 177 (2007).  
Summers was a law professor at the University of Oregon until 1969 when 
he began his first of forty-two years as a professor at Cornell Law School. He is best 
known for his treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code published in 1972. Sum-
Millemann 2/18/2013  7:20 PM 
2012] CASE STUDIES AND THE CLASSROOM 223 
In the spring semester of 1967, I saw a notice on the bulletin board 
inviting law students to apply for summer placements through the Law 
Students Civil Rights Research Council in civil rights organizations in 
the north or the south.
11
 There was a kindred spirit in my class, and we 
both applied. I was accepted and assigned to Louisiana. He went north 
to Seattle. I could not know it at the time, but as a future law school 
professor, I was to be in very good company.
12
   
                                                                                                                                         
mers “helped dramatically increase minority enrollment in American law schools” 
during the 1960s. Lauren Gold, Robert Summers, Pre-eminent Legal Scholar and Be-
loved Teacher, Says Goodbye, CORNELL UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE ONLINE (Dec. 1, 
2010), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Dec10/SummersProfile.html.  
Herbert Titus taught Constitutional Law and common law courses at several 
state law schools, including the Universities of Oregon, Oklahoma, and Colorado, as 
well as at Oral Roberts University School of Law. He was also the founding dean of 
Christian Broadcasting Network University (later named Regent University), and 
then founding dean of its law school. He is now in general practice at William J. Ol-
son, P.C. Herbert W. Titus, WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C. ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 
http://www.lawandfreedom.com/site/aboutus/hwt.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).  
11
 This is my best effort to reconstruct the announcement. I do not have a copy 
but remember generally its content. Northeast law schools, especially the New York 
University School of Law, created LSCRRC. Tony Amsterdam, Norman Dorsen, 
Monroe Freedman, Jack Greenberg, Jacob Javits, Arthur Kinoy, William Kunstler, 
Louis Pollak, Norman Redlich, Eugene Rostow, and William Robinson were on the 
Board. This was national civil rights lawyers recruiting like-minded law students to 
join with them. See Amy R. Tobol, The Law Students Civil Rights Research Council 
71–73 (Aug. 26, 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New 
York at Buffalo). 
12Among my LSCRRC “classmates” who would become noted academics 
were, in alphabetical order, Ursula Bentele, who teaches criminal and capital pun-
ishment law and directs the Capital Defender and Federal Habeas Clinic at Brooklyn 
Law School; Thomas Geraghty, Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Clinical Legal 
Education, and Director of the Bluhm Legal Clinic at Northwestern University 
School of Law; Kenneth Gray, a professor at Duquesne Law School who teaches po-
litical and civil rights among other courses; Lawrence Grosberg, Professor of Law, 
Director of the Lawyering Skills Center, and Co-Director of the Elder Law Clinic at 
New York Law School; David Kairys, a professor at Temple University Beasley 
School of Law, the first James E. Beasley Chair (2001–2007), and a well-known civ-
il rights lawyer; Sylvia Law, the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Medicine, 
and Psychiatry and Co-Director of the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program 
at New York University School of Law and a nationally respected scholar; David 
Rudenstine, former Dean and Sheldon H. Solow Professor of Law at Cardozo Law 
School and a nationally respected scholar; Nadine Taub, S.I. Newhouse Professor of 
Law Emerita at Rutgers Law School and former Director of the Women's Rights Lit-
igation Clinic (1973-2001).  See Ursula Bentele, BROOKLYN LAW SCH., 
https://www.brooklaw.edu/faculty/directory/facultymember/biography.aspx?id=ursul
a.bentele (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); Thomas F. Geraghty, NORTHWESTERN LAW, 
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When I arrived in New Orleans, I went looking for my supervi-
sor, Richard Sobol. He was a pro bono lawyer from Arnold and Porter 
who was the head of the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee 
in Louisiana, the organization to which I had been assigned. He was 
unavailable, however, because, as a plaintiff, he was attending a depo-
sition of Leander Perez, the ultra racist boss of Plaquemines Parish 
(the equivalent of a county), who had arrested Sobol for practicing law 
without a license in Sobol’s representation of Gary Duncan. Perez 
claimed to have created an “isolated jail for civil rights demonstrators” 
in Plaquemines Parish, constructed from an old, below-ground Spanish 
fort that was infested with “[h]uge rattlesnakes and water mocca-
sins.”13 Sobol’s representation of Gary Duncan led to Duncan v. Loui-
siana, in which the Supreme Court recognized a federal constitutional 
right to a jury trial in state criminal cases.
14
 In the end, the federal 
court in Sobol’s case enjoined the state court prosecution of Sobol,15 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/thomasgeraghty/ (last visited Jan. 
5, 2013) Kenneth Gray, DUQUESNE UNIV., http://www/duq.edu/academics/faculty/ 
kenneth-gray (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); Lawrence M. Grosberg, N.Y. LAW SCH., 
http://www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty_profiles/lawrence_m.grosberg  (last visited Jan. 
5, 2013); David Kairys, TEMPLE UNIV. BEASLEY SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.temple.edu/pages/Faculty/N_Faculty_Kairys_main.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2013); Sylvia A. Law, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=20071 (last visited Jan. 
5, 2013); David Rudenstine, CARDOZO LAW, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/Member 
ContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd=ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10540 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2013); RUTGERS SCH. OF LAW-NEWARK, 
http://www.law.newwark.rutgets.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiled/nadine-taub  
(last visited Jan. 5,  2013).  
There were many outstanding lawyers as well, including Nancy Duff 
Campbell, who co-founded the national Women’s Law Center; Alan Houseman, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Center for Law and Social Policy and the most important ad-
vocate for national legal services programs in this country in the last half-century; 
and John Oberdorfer, a Patton Boggs partner who has been a national pro bono lead-
er. See Nancy Duff Campbell, Co-President, Nat’l WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 
http://www.nwlc.org/profile/nancy-campbell (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); Alan W. 
Houseman, CLASP, http://www.clasp.org/experts?id=0006 (last visited Jan. 5, 
2013); John L. Oberdorfer, PATTON BOGGS LLP: ATT’Y AT LAW, 
http://www/pattonboggs.com/joberdorfer/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).        
13
 Perez Readies “Dungeon” For CR “Demonstrators,” LA. WEEKLY, Nov. 2, 
1963, at 2. I have no evidence that it was ever used, and it likely was intended to in-
timidate civil rights workers from coming to Plaquemines Parish.  
14
 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968).  
15
 Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392, 400 (E.D. La. 1968).  
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and the federal court in Duncan’s case enjoined the state court prose-
cution of him.
16
  
The legal work was fascinating and important. Sobol ran the 
civil rights office to which I had been assigned and was lead counsel in 
school desegregation and employment discrimination cases in federal 
courts in Louisiana.
17
 The office also defended civil rights workers, 
like Gary Duncan, who were arrested by local authorities. A Louisiana 
attorney, Donald Juneau, provided essential legal support. Because 
there were only two attorneys in the office, the law students did much 
of the work. 
With the arrogance of youth, I kept no record of the summer of 
1967. What are left behind are recollected vignettes. Here are two of 
them.  
After working in the first part of the summer in New Orleans 
on school desegregation cases, Sobol asked me to tour Northern Loui-
siana, talk to local civil rights leaders, and report on the status of civil 
rights in these communities. I did so with enthusiasm and caution. This 
was a very dangerous area in which the local law enforcement officers 
were usually the source of much of the danger. During the 1960s in the 
south, well over 100 civil rights workers were killed.
18
  
                                                          
16
 Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally PETER J. 
HONIGSBERG, CROSSING BORDER STREET: A CIVIL RIGHTS MEMOIR (2000) 
(describing the work of the Law Students Civil Rights Research Council in 
Louisiana).  
17
 See, e.g., Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. La. 
1970); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 425 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Jenkins v. City of Bogalusa Sch. Bd., 421 F.2d 1339 (5th Cir. 1969); Hall v. St. Hel-
ena Parish Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969); Andrews v. City of Monroe, 425 
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970); Moses v. Wash. Parish Sch. Bd., 421 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
18
 By the time I got to Louisiana in 1967, Ku Klux Klan members and other 
virulent opponents of civil rights had killed many civil rights workers, including 
several white workers. The nationally galvanizing murders were of James Chaney, 
Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner (Goodman and Schwerner were white 
and from the north while Chaney was black and from Mississippi) in 1964. See 
generally Ben Chaney, Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman: The Struggle for Justice, 
27 HUM. RTS. 3 (2000). There had been before then, and were after then, however, 
many more murders, including brutal torture murders, of black civil rights workers. 
Many of these murders were forgotten until the Justice Department, as part of a 
“Cold Case Initiative” in 2006, re-opened and began to re-investigate the cases of 
over 100 black civil rights workers who had been killed in the South during the civil 
rights movement. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SECOND 
ANNUAL REPORT  TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EMMETT TILL UNSOLVED CIVIL 
RIGHTS CRIME ACT OF 2007 7 (2010), available at 
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There were certain survival rules. First, appreciate the danger 
and do not put others at risk. I had been in a car with two other law 
students that broke down on the Lake Pontchartrain freeway. When the 
three of us walked into the only gas station on the bridge, and before 
we could say what we needed, the attendant looked at us, pulled a gun 
out of the cash register, and told us we had thirty seconds to get exit. 
Two of us left immediately. The third stayed behind to argue. Soon 
thereafter, he was sent home. We could not afford his foolhardiness.  
Second, when you travel, drive a car with Louisiana plates. We used 
rental cars from a local agency. Never drive your car, with out-of-state 
license plates, to a meeting with a local civil rights leader. Third, ar-
rive at night at the home of the local civil rights leader, not downtown 
during the day.  
I met many good people on this trip, people who were working 
in their communities to integrate schools, register voters, and desegre-
gate jobs. One was an elderly woman who was the head of a local civil 
rights group. As I recall, a grandson or grandsons of hers had helped 
her run it, but he or they had been drafted and sent to Vietnam. She 
was one of the most courageous people I had ever met. There were 
windows in her house that had been blown out by the Ku Klux Klan 
and mattresses sitting against them.  
The second vignette involves the bar library at the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana. I went there late in the summer to do some legal 
research. When I needed to use the bathroom, I went looking for it. I 
saw two male bathrooms, which had been for “white men,” and for 
“colored men.” The year was 1967, thirteen years after Brown,19 and 
the State Supreme Court had taken down the “white men” and “col-
ored men” signs. These “signs,” however, had been comprised of indi-
vidual letters that had been up so long they stained the wood. This is a 
metaphor I have never forgotten for the lingering effects of race dis-
crimination. The law can make you take down the letters, but how do 
you get the stain out of the wood?  
By the end of the summer, I had found what I had been search-
ing for. I transferred to Georgetown and became fully engaged in law 
school. I have built on that summer ever since in my practice, teach-
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/crm/documents/COLD_CASE_REPORT_2010.pdf. 
After a summer in 1967 Louisiana, I had absolutely no doubt that the heroes of the 
movement were the black civil rights workers who lived in their local communities 
without police protection.         
19
 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954) (declaring that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” 
and an affront to the equal protection guarantees of the 14th Amendment).   
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ing, and scholarship. When I tell these stories to students, I urge them 
to find their passion in the law, and we discuss many of the ways in 
which they can do it, including through summer placements sponsored 
by the Maryland Public Interest Law Project.
20
  
 
III. STATE V. FITZPATRICK: A DEATH PENALTY CASE IN FLORIDA 
 
Seventeen years later, I would return to the south to do civil 
rights work, representing Ernest Fitzpatrick, Jr., this time with the es-
sential help of my law students. Here is the story.  
On April 29, 1980, in Pensacola, Florida, Ernest Fitzpatrick, 
Jr., a twenty-year-old mentally ill, African American, put a .38 revolv-
er into a paper bag, took a bus to a real estate office, and entered the 
office to take a hostage. He “planned” to walk the hostage up the pub-
lic highway to a bank .7 miles away, use the hostage to rob the bank, 
and then, well, “just sort of mingle with the crowd” until “things had 
quieted down” and he “could get back on a bus and leave.”21 Fitzpat-
rick’s motive was to get money so he could help the poor and finance 
his inventions, which included “robots” and “bionic body parts.”22  
Unsurprisingly, Fitzpatrick never got out of the real estate of-
fice. Instead, within a minute or so, he had taken three people into a 
back room within the office, where he waited. Within ten minutes, two 
deputy sheriffs entered and in a shoot-out, Fitzpatrick allegedly killed 
Douglas Heist, a white deputy sheriff and father of five, and then emp-
tied his gun (the other five bullets) while wrestling with one of the 
men he had taken into the office: Paul Parks, a retired naval officer, 
whom he also wounded. Fitzpatrick was shot in the shoulder.
23
 
The local community responded with understandable anger and 
support for the victim’s family. The deputy’s funeral procession, said 
                                                          
20
 One big difference, however, between my experiences and theirs is the 
amount of student debt they are carrying. See Jeff Manning, Law School Graduates 
Lost in Debt, Looking for Work: Diminished Expectations, PORTLAND OREGONIAN 
(Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2012/08/lawyers_lost 
_in_debt_looking_f.html. I did not have this problem, at least to the same extent, 
given the availability of federal student loans at a 3% interest rate. This issue is of 
extraordinary importance for all of us who care about helping law students find their 
passion within the law.   
21
 Brief for Appellant at 6, Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988) 
(No. 70,927) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant] (describing Fitzpatrick’s account to 
Dr. George Barnard, a forensic psychiatrist who testified at Fitzpatrick’s 
resentencing hearing).   
22
 Id. at 6 & n.5. 
23
 Fitzpatrick v. State, 437 So. 2d 1072, 1074–75 (Fla. 1983). 
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to be the largest in the county’s history, “stretched for miles.”24 The 
public defender, who was the sheriff’s stepson and a friend of both 
deputy sheriffs, refused to represent Fitzpatrick.
25
 The trial court ap-
pointed a private lawyer to represent Fitzpatrick in this capital case. He 
had not handled a capital case before and was subsequently suspended 
from the practice of law.
26
  
At trial, the jury convicted Fitzpatrick of first degree murder, 
two counts of attempted murder, and three counts of kidnapping.
27
 Af-
ter “deliberating” thirty-six minutes, the jury unanimously recom-
mended the death penalty (in Florida, the jury’s decision is a recom-
mendation only to the judge).
28
 The judge imposed death, finding five 
aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances.
29
 The 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed both the convictions and the death 
sentence,
30
 and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
31
 
The state of Florida was now getting ready to kill Ernest Fitzpatrick.  
That’s where we came in.  
 
Scharlette Holdman’s Phone Call 
 
In February, 1984, I received a phone call from Scharlette 
Holdman, Executive Director of the Florida Clearinghouse on Crimi-
nal Justice (“Clearinghouse”), an organization that she operated out of 
her rented apartment on a “shoestring budget of just $50,000 a year—
much of it donated by religious groups.”32 Scharlette, as I would learn, 
was “a natural force, like a hurricane or a rockslide; she was unstoppa-
ble.”33 She needed to be. In 1984, Florida was the early national leader 
                                                          
24
 Fallen Hero Honored: 400 Lawmen Pay Tribute, PENSACOLA NEWS J., Apr. 
30, 1980, at 1A. 
25
 Mark O’Brien, Deputy Heist Clings to Life; Suspect Jailed, PENSACOLA 
NEWS J., May. 1 1980, at 1C. 
26
 Florida Bar v. James R. McAtee, 601 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. 1992). 
27
 Fitzpatrick, 437 So. 2d at 1075. 
28
 Id. at 1077 (“After the jury returned with its advisory recommendation of a 
death sentence, the trial judge issued his written findings of fact.”). 
29
 Id. at 1077–78.    
30
 Id. at 1079. 
31
 Fitzpatrick v. Florida, 437 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
1328 (1984).  
32
 Peter Carlson, Florida’s Death Row Defender Stands between 89 
Condemned Men and the Electric Chair, PEOPLE MAG. (Jul. 11, 1983), 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20085454,00.html. 
33
 DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF 
DEATH ROW 143 (1995). 
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in executions. With four of the eleven as of July 1,
34
 Florida was be-
ginning to earn Millard Farmer’s claim that it was “the buckle of the 
death belt” (very soon, however, it would be eclipsed by Texas).35 All 
of these executions took place in southern states.
36
  
Scharlette was recruiting volunteer lawyers from around the 
country—primarily from large firms—to represent Florida prisoners in 
state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings. Florida 
did not then provide counsel in capital post-conviction cases. Instead, 
at the end of the direct appellate process, where Fitzpatrick’s case then 
was, the state required death-sentenced prisoners to represent them-
selves.  
So, the man who took a bus to get a hostage to rob a bank and, 
for an escape plan, was going to “mingle with the crowd” and catch a 
return bus,
37
 was tasked with understanding the complex rules that 
govern state and federal post-conviction procedures, including the sev-
eral different levels of procedural default and several different bodies 
of substantive law that perplex specialized lawyers and judges. From 
his prison cell, he needed to produce the facts that were necessary to 
show, for example, that his trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective 
and that the state had withheld exculpatory evidence in his case.
38
   
Scharlette had thought of me when she read a United Press In-
ternational article announcing that I had been successful in a right-to-
counsel action on behalf of a class of mental patients in Maryland.
39
 
                                                          
34
 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
35
 See ANN RULE, THE STRANGER BESIDE ME 336 (1986). From 1985 to the 
present, Texas has had more executions per year than Florida. Compare Execution 
List: 1976-Present, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html with Executions, TEX. DEP’T OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Aug 22, 2012), 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/dr_executions_by_year.html.  
36
 Texas and Louisiana had carried out two executions apiece while North 
Carolina had performed one. See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions. 
See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., supra note 34. 
37
 Brief for Appellant, supra, note 21, at 10. 
38
 As it would turn out, he had both of these claims. See id. at 84 n.69. 
39
 In Coe v. Hughes, C.A. No. K83-4248 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 1985), we argued 
that the access-to-court right of mental patients required the State to provide counsel 
to patients to help them evaluate and file federal civil rights claims, among other 
claims. The settlement created an external legal assistance program staffed by law-
yers and an internal grievance process for residents. See Darrell M. Nearon, Resident 
Grievance System, DEP’T. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 
http://dhmh.maryland.gov/yourrights/_layouts/mobile/mblwiki.aspx?Url=%2Fyourri
ghts%2FSitePages%2FHome%2Easpx (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
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During spring, 1983, I had used this ongoing civil rights case to teach 
a large section of second semester civil procedure. Students had draft-
ed the pleadings and discovery requests in this action against the state.  
Scharlette explained to me that Ernest was mentally ill and that 
no lawyer in Florida would take his post-conviction case.  
I explained to Scharlette that I had never been involved in a 
capital case, much less as lead counsel; that neither I nor the law 
school had a budget to do this (and Scharlette had none); and that I 
was in the early part of a busy semester teaching a clinical course to an 
overload of students.  
Scharlette explained to me that I could master the required bod-
ies of law quickly. 
I explained, as she well knew, that based on the little bit I knew 
about capital cases, they were insanely complex, combining criminal 
law, criminal procedure, constitutional law, civil procedure, and trial 
practice, among other subjects. 
Scharlette asked whether I had taught any of these courses.   
I mumbled, “Yes” (in fact, I had taught them all), and she 
pointed out, with her wonderful rolling laugh and survival sense of 
humor, “I don’t think Ernest has taught any of them.”  
I explained that there were five states between Maryland and 
Florida, and that somewhere in-between there must be a lawyer who 
would help. 
Scharlette acknowledged the geography but said no lawyer in 
these five states had stepped forward. She added: “Don’t you have law 
students working with you, too, who do most of the work anyway 
(laughing)?” I mumbled, “Yes, kind of.”    
She stressed that the Clearinghouse had helpful packages of 
materials, that she would find local counsel for me, and that she, her 
staff, and two national experts, Mark Olive and Mike Mello, would 
provide as much help as they could in the context of their backbreak-
ing caseloads. Olive and Mello were among a handful of the very best 
capital litigators in the field, and, in fact, they were enormously help-
ful.  
She ended with: “Can I at least have Ernest send you a letter?”  
I said, very relieved, “Of course you can.” Game, set, match to 
Scharlette.   
Earnest Fitzpatrick’s Letter 
 
It was a two-page letter. In the first page, Fitzpatrick intro-
duced himself, described the status of his case, and asked me to come 
visit him. The second page, in hand-written capitalized block letters, 
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read:  
 
“I” ALSO KNOW THAT YOU GO TO “A” 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL THAT HAS A LOT 
OF PEOPLE AT THE SCHOOL, SO PLEASE 
GIVE MY NAME AND ADDRESS TO ALL 
OF PEOPLE AT THE SCHOOL, THAT YOU 
KNOW AND DON’T KNOW, PLEASE TELL 
THEM TO WRITE ME AS “A” PEN PAL, 
AND PLEASE TELL THEM “I” WILL 
WRITE BACK, AND IF THERE IS A 
SCHOOL BULLETIN BOARD, THAT IS 
EASY FOR SCHOOL STUDENTS TO SEE, 
PLEASE PUT MY NAME AND ADDRESS 
ON THE BULLETIN BOARD, AND ALSO 
WRITE ON THE BULLETIN BOARD THAT 
“I” NEED PEOPLE TO WRITE ME, AND “I” 
WILL WRITE BACK. PLEASE DO THESE 
THINGS FOR ME, AND PLEASE WRITE 
BACK SOON.
40
  
 
It read like a letter from a child, or at least a man-child. This, 
however, was a functional adolescent on death row in Florida, whom 
the State was poised to kill. The Florida Supreme Court, four years lat-
er, would agree that Fitzpatrick was a “man-child.” I discuss below 
how we persuaded the Court that this was true but begin with the ques-
tion posed in 1984: should we represent Ernest Fitzpatrick, Jr.? 
My clinical students and I discussed Ernest’s request, provid-
ing one of the most interesting professional responsibility discussions 
we had that semester and that I have ever had in any semester. What 
obligations, if any, did lawyers have to represent, pro bono, pro se 
death-sentenced prisoners? What might be the sources of such an obli-
gation? Could the obligation conceivably stretch from Florida to 
Maryland? What level of minimal competency was ethically required? 
Did we have it or could we develop it? How would you begin to try to 
unravel convictions and a death sentence that the Florida Supreme 
court had affirmed? What about our other pressing obligations as stu-
dents and a lawyer/teacher? How should we balance them? How could 
we possibly finance capital litigation in Florida, from travel expenses 
                                                          
40
 Letter from Ernest Fitzpatrick to Michael Millemann (Feb. 19, 1984) (on 
file with author). 
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to fees for expert witnesses? These were the starting points in a con-
versation that went on for several days.  
We agreed, in the end, that I should go visit Ernest. Although 
we did not admit it, my students and I knew this would be more than a 
“fact-finding and exploratory” visit. We knew we would likely be 
signing on to represent Ernest, although we were not sure how we 
would do it. We had no litigation fund, travel fund, or extra time.
41
 
Practically, there was no way we could do it. Professionally, there was 
no way we couldn’t.  
I wrote Ernest a letter telling him the week, but not the day, I 
would come. I had to travel from the east coast of Florida, where the 
prison was located, to middle Florida, where Scharlette was located, to 
Pensacola on the west coast, where the homicide had occurred. I was 
not sure when I would be at the prison. This imprecision would prove 
to be an important part of my conversation with Earnest and of my ed-
ucation about the death culture in Florida.   
My worst fear was at the prospect of litigating the case “under 
warrant.” Then, the Florida Governor would sign a death warrant 
sometime after the Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct review. 
The Supreme Court had done this in Fitzpatrick’s case a few days after 
we received the letter. The good news, at least for Fitzpatrick, was that 
there were many other death-sentenced prisoners in Florida at the time, 
and although Fitzpatrick was working his way up the prioritized exe-
cution list (which was not public), he probably was not near the top 
yet, and he had some time, probably, but not much, probably. We just 
didn’t know.  
“Litigating under warrant” meant that a death-sentenced pris-
oner would have thirty days to prepare pleadings for six different 
courts, file the pleadings in each, and litigate in all six of those courts 
unless somewhere along the line the prisoner obtained a stay of execu-
tion.
42
 One of Florida’s most experienced capital litigators explained:  
                                                          
41
 After my trip to Florida, I sent a letter describing Ernest’s case to members 
of the faculty and lawyers throughout the metropolitan Baltimore area, asking for 
their support in creating a litigation fund. They responded wonderfully, creating a 
$20,000 litigation fund. We would spend this fund on expert witnesses and other 
litigation costs. If anyone reading this article contributed to that fund, thank you 
again! 
42
 The State process started with a post-conviction pleading in Escambia 
County Circuit Court, followed by an appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, and then 
a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The federal process began 
with a habeas corpus petition in district court, followed by an appeal to the United 
States Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit, and then a writ of certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
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Such litigation [entails] . . . defense lawyers fly-
ing from court to court in search of a stay, as 
the case moves down the assembly line of the 
capital appeals process from state trial court, to 
Florida Supreme Court, to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, to Federal District Court, to the Eleventh 
Circuit, to the U.S. Supreme Court, sometimes 
in a matter of days. The Ted Bundy case, for 
example, was decided by three different courts 
in one day.
43
  
 
This “process” nullified any theoretical protections provided by the 
state and federal post-conviction processes by making fact-finding, in-
formed advocacy, and rational decision-making virtually impossible.   
The key to preventing a warrant was to file a pleading in the 
case, at least one that had some merit. That would stop the warrant 
clock. So, when I went to Florida, it was to do as much as possible in a 
week to find a meritorious post-conviction claim, stop the warrant 
clock, and give my students and me time to do the fact-finding and le-
gal research we needed to adequately represent Earnest. I also had to 
interview Fitzpatrick in Starke (in eastern Florida), meet with 
Holdman in Tallahassee (middle Florida), and go to Pensacola (west-
ern Florida) to investigate the case.
44
 
The existing case record, however, was only the starting point. 
As I would learn in this case and have reinforced in subsequent capital 
cases in which I have been counsel, the best vantage point for a capital 
post-conviction lawyer is to assume that the client has just been arrest-
ed and that you are the original defense counsel. You must think about 
what you would do as a good trial attorney to prepare the case for trial 
and what evidence you think the state might have, including exculpa-
tory evidence. The two most important claims in post-conviction cases 
are that the trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective (read “grossly 
incompetent” in ways that prejudiced the result),45 and that the state 
failed to turn over exculpatory evidence.
46
 The facts that support these 
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 Michael Mello, “In the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law”: Diary 
of a Capital Appeals Lawyer (1983–1986), 24 VT. L. REV. 583, 676 (2000). 
44
  I drove to Florida, through Florida, and back over spring break.      
45
 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (finding that to 
prevail on a claim, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense). 
46
 See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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claims rarely appear in the trial and appellate records. The claims are 
for what the defense lawyer and state did not do rather than what they 
did. As I would discover, there was overwhelming evidence of both 
claims in Fitzpatrick’s case.  
 
Meeting Ernest 
 
I walked through several sets of fences, with heaping rolls of 
razor wire between each, as I entered the Florida State Prison. By 
1984, I had visited many prisoners in many prisons in over seventeen 
years of practice. This one was locked down and remarkably quiet. 
When I got to the visiting room, a guard brought Fitzpatrick in. 
He was about 6’1” or so and had a substantial Afro. He was dressed in 
a green one-piece jumpsuit, hands cuffed behind his back, with a chain 
connecting the hand shackles to leg shackles. I asked the guard to take 
off the shackles, but the most he would do was move the hand shackles 
from back to front. After several requests, ranging from polite to asser-
tive, the guard finally agreed to sit outside the interview room.  
Earnest and I shook hands as best we could as I introduced my-
self. Before I could get any further, he jumped in. “Thank you for 
coming, but you need to tell me when you are coming, not just the 
week or day, but the exact time; please, please do this,” he said, obvi-
ously agitated. He repeated this request two or three times. “I am sor-
ry,” I said, when he paused, “but I have a lot of things to do this week 
throughout the state and . . . .,” but then he cut me off, repeating his 
request. I reassured him that I would do so in the future, which seemed 
to satisfy him. He then added, calmer: “And, when you come, please 
bring with you, pens—not the regular pens, but ballpoint pens that 
have the bubbles in the middle.” I said “Okay,” but he continued, “and 
paper pads, not the yellow ones but the white ones;” and when I said 
“Okay,” he continued, “and envelopes, not the usual ones with V flaps, 
but the ones with circular flaps,” and when I said “Okay,” and quickly 
added, with some impatience, “let’s talk about your case,” he said, 
head cocked back, “Okay, what do you want to know?” We talked for 
several hours.  
When I later met with Scharlette and described the interview, 
she explained the first part, the need to tell the prisoner exactly when 
you are coming. Then, when the governor signed a death warrant, the 
guards came to the prisoner’s cell and said not, “The governor has 
signed your death warrant. Please come out.” Rather, they said, “You 
have an attorney’s visit.” When the prisoner came out, in the now 
locked-down prison, the guards walked him from tier to tier, through 
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several gates, introducing him down the tier with the phrase “dead man 
coming” or “dead man walking” until they reached a death cell near 
the electric chair, where they put the prisoner. There, he had thirty 
days to live unless he could quash the warrant. Ernest thought the an-
nouncement of my visit might be the trigger of this process. I never 
again visited him without telling him the exact day and time I would 
arrive.
47
  
 
How the Death Penalty Deterred the Lawyer who was the Head of 
the Florida Criminal Appeals Division From Choking to Death 
One of His Ex-Wives 
 
I had thought, as former head of the Civil Division and Chief 
General Counsel of the Maryland Attorney General’s Office from 
1979-82, I would have some credibility in my effort to develop a 
working relationship with the Florida Attorney General’s Office, and 
thereby to gain time to litigate Ernest’s case without a warrant. This 
did not happen. The key people in the Florida Attorney General’s Of-
fice swore deep allegiance to the death penalty and were not interested 
                                                          
47
 A pirated copy of the then Florida execution guidelines described with 
chilling clarity what happened in the last five days of an inmate’s life. On execution 
day minus five, the “[e]xecution squad” was identified and the designated electrician 
tested all execution equipment, including the emergency generator and telephone. On 
execution day minus four, the inmate was measured for clothing; the inmate 
“specifie[d] in writing funeral arrangements;” a death watch supervisor and cell front 
monitor were assigned (in part, to prevent inmate suicides); the “[i]nmate personally 
re-inventor[ied] all property and seal[ed] property for storage;” and the institution 
chaplain was notified. Execution day minus three was a day of relative rest; there 
were no activities other than those of the front cell monitor. On execution day minus 
two, there was a “drill” for the “[e]xecution squad.” Execution day minus one was 
busy, involving all parts of the prison staff, from security through food, medical, 
programs and information. There was another “[e]xecution squad drill;” the assistant 
superintendent for operations tested the telephone; the electrician tested the equip-
ment, including the emergency generator, and “[made] up [the] ammonium chloride 
solution and soak[ed] [the] sponges;” the condemned inmate ordered his last meal; 
the chief medical officer prepared the certificate of death, with the cause listed as 
“legal execution by electrocution;” the central office finalized the official witness 
list; the assistant superintendent for programs confirmed the funeral arrangements 
with the inmate’s family; the information office arrived to handle media inquiry and 
identified the twelve media pool observers; a security meeting was held; and the exe-
cutioner was contacted. The activities on execution day, which began at 4:30 a.m. 
with the last meal, and ended at 7:20-7:30 a.m. with the removal of the dead inmate 
from the chair and payment of the executioner, take four single spaced pages to de-
scribe. SUPERINTENDENT OF FLA. STATE PRISON, EXECUTION GUIDELINES DURING 
ACTIVE DEATH WARRANT 235–38 (1983) (on file with author). 
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in extending courtesies to out-of-state counsel. Interviews of George 
Georgieff, Chief of the Florida Criminal Appeals Division and head of 
its death penalty unit, and Georgieff’s top assistant, Ray Markey, help 
to explain why.  
 
 “I was having a fight with one of my 
ex-wives and I found myself choking her, and I 
saw her eyes start to pop out, and suddenly off 
to the left or the right I saw the electric chair.”   
. . . . 
“It deterred me,” said Georgieff, head of 
the criminal appeals division of the Florida At-
torney General’s office.  
Georgieff’s personal experience was re-
counted in the September issue of the “Ameri-
can Lawyer” in an article by reporter Stephen 
Adler. 
“I have told that story many times to 
people who ask me how I can be so sure that 
capital punishment is a deterrent to murder,” he 
told UPI going back over the incident in an in-
terview yesterday. 
“It was a long time ago, but it’s not the 
kind of thing you forget,” he said. 
Georgieff said he frequently tells the 
State Supreme Court, in urging death sentences 
be upheld, that death row inmates are “mag-
gots.” 
“That is what they are,” he said, “They 
are 2% of the 92% that are brought to trial, the 
very worst. They are the least among us.” 
“That doesn’t mean they (death row in-
mates) don’t have rights, but neither does it 
mean they have more rights than anyone else. 
We are the good guys, that obey the law,” he 
said. 
He said he sometime describes himself 
to the high court as “the ultimate whore.” 
“The madam doesn’t expect her girls to 
say they won’t go with a customer because he 
smells bad,” Georgieff said. 
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“We don’t ask questions. That is up to 
the judges and the attorney general (who sits on 
the Clemency Board). We come over here as 
the ultimate whores,” he said. 
Scharlette Holdman, head of Florida 
Citizens Against the Death Penalty calls the re-
marks “startling.”48 
 
Brain Surgery to Remove Anti-Social Behavior 
 
The state’s other top specialist in death 
penalty law, Georgieff’s assistant Ray Markey . 
. . told Adler that 50 years from now, surgeons 
will be able to perform brain operations on peo-
ple to remove their anti-social behavior pat-
terns. 
Marky, who successfully defended 
against appeals by Jon Spenkelink, the only 
person to die in the Florida electric chair in the 
past two decades, says Spenkelink was probably 
the “least obnoxious individual on death row . . 
. a guy who killed a faggot.” 
Spenkelink, convicted of killing a trav-
eling companion in a Tallahassee motel in 
1973, died on May 25, 1979. Gov. Bob Graham 
has ordered 18 other executions, but all have 
been stayed by the courts for further appeals.  
There are currently 168 inmates on Flor-
ida’s death row. Marky, 46, said in an unusually 
candid interview he was disgusted by human 
beings. “They can’t even behave as well as an-
imals. At least animals kill only for need.” 
Marky, who is just under five feet tall 
but speaks in a booming voice, helped write the 
capital punishment law, passed by the 1972 leg-
islature after a prior law was struck down by the 
Supreme Court. A native of Buffalo, N.Y., he 
has worked for the attorney general for 15 years 
. . . .  
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 State Prosecutor Tells: “Suddenly I Saw the Electric Chair,” FLA. 
FLAMBEAU, Sept. 17, 1981, at 1. 
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“I couldn’t care less about punishment 
per se. I want [the convict] gone. I want to be 
rid of him,” Marky said.49 
A coalition of groups, including the 
Clearinghouse, called for the firing of the two, 
saying: “The statements about wife abuse, civil 
liberties, and the value of human rights by two 
of the State’s highest staff members in the at-
torney general’s office shock the conscience of 
those of us concerned with social justice.”50 
However, “a spokesman [for Attorney General 
Jim Smith] said Smith had not been moved. 
‘We’re not going to respond to any of that,’ said 
Spokesman Don North. ‘He (Smith) has no in-
tention of asking for their resignations.’”51 
  
Finding an Argument to Stop the Death Warrant Clock 
 
When I returned to Baltimore, with a new appreciation for our task, 
my students and I began searching for a legal argument that we could use to 
stop the death warrant clock. My research assistant, Lisa Kershner, and I 
continued the search in the beginning of the summer of 1984, after the end 
of the spring semester. Lisa became a colleague, effectively co-counsel, and 
a good friend through her extraordinary summer work.  She found what we 
needed.  
A little background is necessary. One of the mitigating circumstanc-
es in Florida’s death penalty law is that the defendant has no “significant 
history of prior criminal activity.”52 At Fitzpatrick’s sentencing hearing, the 
court allowed the state to introduce Fitzpatrick’s bizarre juvenile record in 
its case-in-chief. The state argued that with this evidence, it was preemptive-
ly rebutting the “significant history of prior criminal activity” mitigator.53 
The problem was that defense counsel had waived reliance on that mitigator 
to keep the juvenile evidence out of the death penalty proceeding.
54
  
The primary part of Earnest’s juvenile record was an arrest in 1974 
when he came to his vocational school wearing a mask, with paint on his 
                                                          
49
 Id. 
50
 See Death Penalty Opinions: Group Wants Top Aides to State Attorney 
General Fired, ST. PETERSBURG IND., Sept. 22, 1981 at 4.  
51
 Id. 
52
 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(a) (2012). 
53
 Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1986).  
54
 Id.   
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face. He allegedly entered the principal's office with a five-gallon can of 
gasoline, a flashbulb, and a battery, which he claimed were rigged as a 
bomb. He also had a machete. Fitzpatrick was subdued without harming 
anyone. The psychologist who evaluated him said Fitzpatrick told him: 
 
He . . . planned to hold the principal and several 
other school officials as hostages until "the po-
lice or someone would bring me a million dol-
lars so that I could give the money to the poor." 
Ernest reported to me that he had been working 
on this plan for months and that the initial impe-
tus for his plan occurred when he was watching 
a news program where he saw many starving 
children. From his report, it appears that the 
children were the subject of a documentary on 
Bangladesh and also possibly children of some 
nations in Africa who were experiencing very 
hard times due to the drought there. However, 
Ernest did not understand the geographical lo-
cation of these children and thought that he 
would be able to distribute the money to them 
and to their families . . . . [H]e went on to de-
scribe that he planned to hide under some 
boarded-up steps near Beggs School, planned to 
bury the money in a hole, wait “until the heat 
was off" and then begin to distribute the money 
. . . . [L]ater in his life he planned to build a 
very big house "where all the poor children 
could come, where I could feed them and carry 
them to the hospital when they needed it." Ern-
est also stated that he would keep part of the 
money to experiment with the building of air-
liners. He felt quite confident that he could 
build an airliner and went on to explain that he 
had built several cardboard plans which ap-
peared to work and he did not see any reason 
why he could not apply these same principles 
on a larger scale.
55
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 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 34 n.25 (quoting from an evaluation 
report performed by Dr. Lawrence Gilgun, a clinical psychologist). When we 
interviewed Ernest’s mother, she explained that it may have been the derision of his 
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The psychologist concluded that Earnest was legally sane un-
der the Florida version of the M’Naghten test because he knew right 
from wrong.
56
 So, Fitzpatrick was committed to a Florida juvenile fa-
cility rather than a mental health facility, a missed opportunity to diag-
nose and treat Ernest’s underlying disorder(s).  
The legal issues in 1984 were: 1) whether the anticipatory re-
buttal by the state violated the death penalty law, and if so, 2) whether 
the failure of Fitzpatrick’s appellate lawyer to raise the issue on appeal 
constituted legally cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel. Lisa 
discovered a Florida Supreme Court decision holding that an anticipa-
tory rebuttal similar to what the state did in Fitzpatrick’s case violated 
the death penalty law: “Mitigating factors,” the court said, “are for the 
defendant’s benefit, and the State should not be allowed to present 
damaging evidence against the defendant to rebut a mitigating circum-
stance that the defendant expressly concedes does not exist.”57   
Because Fitzpatrick’s appellate lawyer had missed this issue, 
and it affected the direct appeal, we prepared a habeas corpus petition 
to reopen the appeal based on appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, 
which we filed directly in the Florida Supreme Court.   
At the same time, we worked on a clemency petition for the 
governor and members of his cabinet, as well as a post-conviction peti-
tion. In the latter, we planned to argue, among other claims, that the 
trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective. We were required to file 
the latter petition in the Escambia County Circuit Court, but it would 
take several more trips to Pensacola and more time to adequately pre-
pare it.   
We filed the habeas petition in August 1984, tolling the war-
rant clock. We breathed a big sigh of relief. The Florida Supreme 
Court allowed me to argue the habeas case pro hac vice. It would be 
nearly two years before the court rendered a decision.   
                                                                                                                                         
schoolmates at one of his inventions that helped to provoke the incident. He had 
taken a cardboard airplane to school the day before, and the other students laughed at 
him. The next day, his mother saw him sitting in a chair at the dining room table, as 
if he were in a trance. From time to time, she would look over at him to see what he 
was doing. When she looked again, “He wasn’t there.” Later, “We got a call from the 
high school that he walked in there with his face all painted and with something he 
called a bomb and said he was going to blow up the school.” 
56
 In Florida, the test for insanity is the M'Naghten test, which provides, inter 
alia, that a person is legally insane when he is precluded by mental disease from dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the act. Wheeler v. State, 344 
So.2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1977). 
57
 Maggard v. State, 399 So.2d 973, 978 (Fla. 1981). 
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In June 1986, the court ruled. We won on the anticipatory re-
buttal issue! The court said the trial court had “allowed the state to 
present improper non-statutory circumstances in aggravation,” and this 
allowed the state to depict “the defendant as an experienced criminal 
in a way not sanctioned by our capital felony sentencing law.”58 We 
not only had stopped the warrant clock; we had obtained a new sen-
tencing hearing for Ernest as well.
59
  
 
The Re-sentencing Hearing in Pensacola 
 
The hearing was set for May 1987, and we had a lot to do. My 
students in the Constitutional Law Clinic began work on pre-hearing 
motions and memoranda and continued their long-distance fact inves-
tigation. Although it was a “re-sentencing” in legal effect, procedurally 
the state would be forced to put on its full case again since the hearing 
would be before a new jury, impaneled seven years after Ernest had 
been convicted and sentenced to death. The court would instruct the 
new jury that it was bound by the verdicts in the case, particularly the 
finding of first degree murder, but to understand what happened, and 
why the state was seeking the death penalty, it would have to hear all 
of the evidence. In any event, the vast majority of evidence was also 
relevant to the array of aggravating circumstances that the state would 
seek to establish.  
Scharlette had recruited a volunteer lawyer in Pensacola, John 
Carr. He is now, and was then, a wonderful lawyer and acted as lead 
counsel at the re-sentencing hearing. My students and I took primary 
responsibility for preparing for the hearing, including obtaining expert 
witnesses and drafting the extensive array of pre-hearing motions and 
supporting memoranda. At the hearing, I took primary responsibility 
for the expert witnesses.  
 
Arguing our Case to the Widow 
 
There was, however, a threshold issue to resolve. The prosecu-
tor had told us that if we could convince the slain deputy’s widow to 
accept life imprisonment, he would agree to that. John took the lead on 
this effort. He met with the widow and asked her to accept a life im-
prisonment sentence instead of the death penalty. She said that he 
                                                          
58
 Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1986).   
59
 The error had affected the sentencing hearing and not the trial, so the Court 
did not reverse the convictions.  See id. 
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should talk to her five children, who wanted the death penalty. When 
John checked, through back channels, about their views, he was told 
they were adamant about seeking the death penalty. The issue died at 
this point.    
I mention this story because it provides an important teaching 
moment in the case. To summarize, the death penalty is constitutional, 
in part, because prosecutors exercise the charging discretion and that 
discretion is confined by statutory standards. A widow in another case, 
the prosecutor pointed out, had declined to seek the death penalty be-
cause she had religious objections to it. Heist’s widow and her chil-
dren, as it turned out, did not and instructed the prosecutor to seek the 
death penalty against Ernest.  
Having determined that Fitzpatrick was death-eligible (certain-
ly the original death sentence did this), was the prosecutor appropriate-
ly listening to the constituents who had suffered the greatest loss? Did 
we receive something, a chance for mercy, to which we were not legal-
ly entitled or was the administration of the death penalty being dele-
gated to individuals who, understandably, were the angriest at the de-
fendant? The answer may be yes to all of these questions. In any event, 
we filed a motion seeking to preclude the death penalty because the 
prosecutor had delegated the decision to the wife and children, which 
the court denied summarily.   
 
Who Shot the Deputy Sheriff? 
 
Defense counsel never argued that Ernest did not shoot Heist. 
The state’s witnesses said that he did, but when we looked again at the 
evidence, we began to have doubts. In his testimony at the original 
sentencing proceeding, Fitzpatrick did not clearly admit or deny that 
he shot Heist but rather said he did not know. It is clear from his 
statement on the 911 tape, set forth below, that Fitzpatrick did not 
know whether he shot Heist.   
The facts are these. When Ernest told Mary Helen Blake, a sec-
retary in the real estate office, that “he wanted to use her as a shield 
and take her to a bank,” she “resisted,” and Ernest acquiesced.60 He 
moved her further inside the real estate office, “down a hallway toward 
the back of the building,” around “a corner.”61 Blake said Fitzpatrick 
repeated that "he wasn't going to hurt me," "shoot me," or "rape me," 
                                                          
60
 See Fitzpatrick v. State, 437 So. 2d 1072, 1074 (Fla. 1983). 
61
 Id. 
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although he did threaten to shoot her "in the leg," and later said that he 
might shoot himself and the hostages if the police came.
62
  
When Eric Shaw, a delivery boy, came in “the front door and 
walked down the same hallway, looking for someone to sign a re-
ceipt,”63 Ernest told him to lock the front door and took both of them 
into an inner office.
64
 “Meanwhile, David Parks, who was in a nearby 
office when appellant entered the building, called the sheriff.”65 Parks 
then approached Ernest and “offered [him] the keys to his car and 
some money.”66 Ernest “refused, saying he wanted [Blake] to go with 
him,” and “then marched his three hostages into the [inner] office.”67 
There he “sat on a desk chair next to the window [that had a] partition 
[sliding window] between the [inner] office and the reception area and 
forced [the secretary] to sit on his lap.”68 He “ordered [the delivery 
boy] and Parks to sit down at opposite walls.”69 Chart A depicts the of-
fice, locations of the hostages, and pathways of the bullets according 
to the Escambia County Sheriff’s Department.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 11.  
63
 Fitzpatrick, 437 So.2d at 1074. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. at 1074–75. 
68
 Id. at 1075. 
69
 Fitzpatrick, 437 So.2d at 1075.  
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Charts A & B: The reconstructed crime scheme shows the path of the 
bullets that Fitzpatrick allegedly shot (Chart A: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) 
and those that Deputy Sheriff Smith shot (Chart B: 6 & 7).  Both Fitz-
patrick and Deputy Sheriff Smith shot from 0.38 pistols.  Ballistics 
tests could not determine the gun the gun that fired the fatal shot.  Bul-
let fragments 14 and 14(a) killed Deputy Sheriff Heist.  The broken 
line in the lower right corner of Chart A is that fatal bullet’s projected 
pathway. 
 
     
Chart A  
             
Chart B 
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 “Within ten minutes of Parks'[s] phone call, two sheriff's depu-
ties arrived and entered through the front door.” “Deputy Smith crept 
down the hallway and tried turning the handle to the office door.”70  
Deputy Heist positioned himself next to the sliding window, which 
was open.  
Blake tells the next part of the story in her statement at the 
sheriff’s office shortly after the shooting. She had wanted to close the 
partition “in case a policeman came in from the front door,” because 
“[she] didn't want the black guy to see him,” but she was unable to do 
so.
71
 What followed is detailed below: 
 
A. [T]hen the police man put the gun through 
the window (subject started crying). 
Q. Okay . . . .  
A. And . . . told him not to move . . . . 
Q. [W]as the black man facing the . . . the little 
window at that time?  
A. [He was] facing [towards Eric and Paul]. 
Q. Okay, facing back towards the center of the 
room. 
A. Yeah, and the . . . door was there, and the 
partition is right to here.  
Q. Okay. 
A. So, the police man was right here. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It was like, a distance maybe . . . 6 or 12 
inches. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I don't remember at the time whether he had 
the gun in my lap or if he was still holding it 
towards Paul or Eric and when the policeman 
brought the gun up . . . I don't know if, if the 
black man let go of his grip on me or what . . . 
but . . . there were, I remember three shots, I 
think . . . and then the policeman fell . . . (cry-
ing) and I knew he had gotten shot . . . . 
Q. Okay . . . were you lookin' at his gun as it 
came through the window? 
                                                          
70
 Id. 
71Statement of Mary Helen Blake to Pensacola Sheriff’s Office (April 29, 
1984) (on file with author). 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did he fire a shot? 
A. [N]o, I think the black man fired the first 
shot . . . and then the policeman I think fired a 
shot . . . somebody fired a shot but I think there 
were three, a total of three shots . . . .
72
 
 
Deputy Smith testified that the first shot came through the wall 
where he was standing.
73
  When Smith called the Sheriff’s Department 
at 9:13, the taping equipment picked up, in the background, the voice 
of Ernest Fitzpatrick. 
 
Fitzpatrick: I didn't shoot him, did I?  
Smith: Yeah.  
Fitzpatrick: Oh, My God.  
Smith: Help me. Hello.  
Voice: Emergency operator.  
Smith: [I am at] 123 New Warrington Road, get 
me an ambulance down here. I have got a police 
officer down.  
Fitzpatrick: Please don't die [phone ringing].  
Smith: Move it.  
Fitzpatrick: Please don't. 
Smith: Get me two ambulances.  
Dispatcher: Hello, this is the dispatcher.  
Smith: This is Ed Smith. I have an officer 
down. I have three people shot. Get an ambu-
lance.  
Dispatcher: Where at?  
Smith: 123 New Warrington Road, Fanning Re-
alty.
74
 
 
Both Smith and Ernest had .38 caliber handguns, and, accord-
ing to the Sheriff’s Office, ballistics tests could not determine which of 
the .38 guns shot the bullet that killed Heist.
75
 The charts show the 
pathways of the bullets of Fitzpatrick and Smith.  
                                                          
72
 Id. (emphasis added) 
73
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 12. 
74
 Transcript of 911 tape (emphasis added). 
75
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 83. 
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The state, by reconstructing the crime scene, had proven that 
Bullet # 1, which had split into fragments (1a and 1b), had killed Heist, 
and that Fitzpatrick had shot this bullet from his gun. It contended this 
during the original trial and sentencing, and the jury accepted this in its 
verdict. The state also proved that Smith had shot a bullet, #7, into the 
base of a cabinet above Heist’s head.  
When we looked at the ballistics evidence, however, we saw 
that fragments 1a and 1b did not weigh enough for a full bullet. So, we 
retained a former FBI agent to examine the bullets, and he concluded 
that fragments 1a and 1b, which Fitzpatrick allegedly shot, and Bullet 
#7, the bullet Smith shot, were all fragments. Fragments 1a and 1b 
were the base of a bullet. Fragment 7, which was embedded in the 
overhanging cabinet directly under which Heist was standing, was a 
large bullet fragment that had a missing base. It was "bevelled" and 
had a white substance on it (later determined to be human bone). The 
two small fragments (1a and 1b) and the larger fragment (7) constitut-
ed a single bullet. The state had concluded that Bullet #7 had come 
from Deputy Smith's gun by reconstructing the crime scene, and be-
cause "the rifling impressions . . . were consistent with those produced 
by [a] Smith and Wesson .38," Deputy Smith's gun.
76
  
We submitted the three fragments for a metallurgical and com-
positional examination. It established, beyond all reasonable doubt, 
that the three fragments comprised a single bullet. According to the 
state’s evidence—the evidence that put Fitzpatrick on death row—
Deputy Smith, not Fitzpatrick, had shot Heist. The bullet had broken 
apart in Heist’s skull, with two fragments remaining inside and the 
third ricocheting up into the overhanging cabinet.  
To make matters worse, there was compelling evidence that the 
state knew this before Fitzpatrick’s trial. The examiner who did our 
test told us that that the large fragment, Bullet 7, previously had been 
"mounted" for a similar test. “Someone did this test before,” our exam-
iner said. When we submitted a Brady discovery request,
77
 the state 
revealed that it had requested a metallurgical examination in 1980, but 
for unexplained reasons, it said the state’s lab could not actually do the 
test, and therefore there were no test results.
78
 So, the state lab had 
mounted the large bullet fragment for the test, but had not actually 
done the test? Right.  
                                                          
76
 Id. at 83–84.  
77
 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
78
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 84 & n.69.  
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The challenges for us now, were how to use this evidence at a 
re-sentencing hearing in which the new jury was going to be instructed 
that they were bound by the previous jury’s verdict that had estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that Fitzpatrick had shot Heist, and 
why it mattered that Fitzpatrick had not shot Heist. After all, Fitzpat-
rick caused the shoot-out by taking the hostages into a small room, 
some might argue.   
 
Establishing Ernest’s Mental Illness 
 
The record of Ernest’s mental illness had been substantially 
underdeveloped at the trial and sentencing, and defense counsel had 
not linked what mental health evidence there was to Ernest’s behavior 
on April 29, 1980, the key to developing an effective mitigation de-
fense.  
In developing the mental illness evidence, Lisa began with the 
family. In preparing the clemency petition, she interviewed and pre-
pared affidavits for eleven siblings, none of whom original defense 
counsel had interviewed. Two of Fitzpatrick's sisters, Barbara and Ida, 
provided the most compelling evidence, which later would be the basis 
for their testimony at the re-sentencing hearing. Neither recalled Ernest 
voluntarily touching or hugging a family member. Both recalled abrupt 
changes in his mood: "within a few minutes he can change to about 
five different moods;" from "calm" to "all of a sudden just agitated" 
back to "calm." Suddenly, he was "a little child," and "the next second 
he may just start laughing."
79
 He stayed in his room during the day, 
coming out at night when the family went to bed or early in the morn-
ing. Whenever he left the room, he would padlock it, even if it was just 
to go to the bathroom. Late at night and early in the mornings, he 
would go outside, where he would be "walking around" and "talking 
with someone," although there was no one there.
80
 He would be "shak-
ing his head" and "sometimes he would say things like he was disa-
greeing with someone."
81
 "He would just be strolling along like he had 
someone on the side of him."
82
  
We gathered records. Ernest’s birth certificate indicated he had 
been born prematurely and weighed four pounds at birth.
83
 The only 
                                                          
79
 Id. at 8 & n.9. 
80
 Id. at 8 n.9.  
81
 Id. 
82
 Id.  
83
 Id. at 2–3. 
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document left from his juvenile commitment (the state destroyed all 
other records five years after the juvenile was released), was a three-
by-five note card that had Ernest’s name on the front and two words—
“schizophrenic and suicidal”—on the back.84 We found other records 
containing evidence of Ernest’s mental illness.85 
We talked to professionals and teachers who knew Ernest in 
high school and afterwards, including three with whom defense coun-
sel never spoke. Dr. Robert Dorsey was the child psychologist at the 
high school Fitzpatrick attended.
86
 He counseled Fitzpatrick several 
times per week during a four or five month period in 1974. He also 
tested him. He diagnosed Fitzpatrick as psychotic and schizophrenic 
and “recommended strongly" that "he be sent to a neurologist for a 
good neurological examination."
87
 He thought Fitzpatrick "had some-
thing organically wrong with his brain."
88
 At the resentencing hearing, 
Dr. Dorsey testified that, in lay terms, Fitzpatrick “was crazy as a 
loon," emotionally between ten and twelve years old, and operating at 
the "borderline" of intelligence.
89
  
Charles Stevens, a special education teacher, tutored Fitz-
patrick regularly after Fitzpatrick was released from the juve-
nile system and when he was attending a special learning center.
90
 
Mr. Stevens regularly observed Fitzpatrick carrying on a conver-
sation with someone that "he could probably picture mentall y ,
"
 but 
who wasn’t there.91 Fitzpatrick told him that he "heard people 
talking to him.
"92
 Mr. Stevens added that he brought this to his 
wife's attention because Fitzpatrick was 
"
carrying on a conversa-
tion like that" and 
"
doing all this gesturing and posturing.
"93
 He 
said, 
"[T]here is something wrong with [him],” and his wife 
"
agreed that there was something definitely wrong."
94
 Stevens 
said it took Fitzpatrick twelve times to pass his G.E.D. and that 
                                                          
84
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 8–9. 
85
 See id. at 2–4. 
86
 Id. at 4 & n.2. Dr. Dorsey taught at the Louisiana State University Medical 
School, supervised graduate students in psychology, taught graduate and 
undergraduate courses, and had performed court-appointed competency and 
responsibility evaluations for eleven years. Id. at 4 n.2. 
87
 Id.at 4. 
88
 Id.  
89
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
90
 Id. at 7–8 & n.8. 
91
 Id. at 7–8 n.8. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. at 7–8 n.8 
94
 Id. 
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because the exams were standardized, he probably took the same 
three exams three or four times apiece.
95
  
Ernest Bugg was a juvenile services counselor who provided 
counseling to Fitzpatrick.  He said that Fitzpatrick "frequently heard 
voices," would "phase right out of the room," and would engage in a 
"rocking motion" during which he would "carry on conversation with 
himself."
96
 He would go from "high to low" moods "in a matter of 
minutes."
97
  
We retained several experts, as well. Dr. James Merikangas, a 
neurologist,
98
 concluded that Fitzpatrick had organic brain syndrome 
and was "severely and diffusely impaired.”99 He said Fitzpatrick had 
suffered "an injury prior to birth” and had been brain "damaged all his 
life."
100
 He said Fitzpatrick had “the mind of a child” even though he 
was twenty-seven years old at the time of the examination.
101
 Dr. 
George Barnard, a forensic psychiatrist,
102
 opined that Fitzpatrick had 
been "seriously mentally ill for a number of years going back actually 
to his childhood."
103
 He stressed Fitzpatrick's "very long history" of 
"delusional ideas" that were "not based on reality," including delusions 
that he was a “great inventor."104 He concluded that Fitzpatrick's ca-
                                                          
95
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 7–8 n.8.  
96
 Id. at 7 & n.7. 
97
 Id. at 7 n.7. 
98
 Dr. Merikangas graduated from Johns Hopkins University School of Medi-
cine, was a resident in psychiatry and neurology at Yale University, and had been a 
member of the University of Pittsburgh and Yale University Schools of Medicine, 
teaching neurology and psychiatry. He had conducted thousands of neurological 
evaluations in sixteen years of practice, and was board-certified in-both psychiatry 
and neurology. He had consulted with numerous governmental and private groups 
about the competence and mental state of people, including the Connecticut State Po-
lice, a state’s attorney’s office, a juvenile court, a circuit court, the Social Security 
Administration, and the United States Navy. He also had published about two-dozen 
articles in medical journals, edited one book, and had performed a large number of 
competency and responsibility evaluations. Id. at 2 n.1.  
99
 Id. at 2.  
100
 Id. at 2–3. 
101
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 2. 
102
 Dr. Barnard graduated from the University of North Carolina Medical 
School. He had taught, practiced medicine and psychiatry, and supervised in-patient 
psychiatric units at the University of Florida since 1963, where he was chief of the 
consultation and medical liaison section of the psychiatry department. Dr. Barnard 
had supervised several hundred medical doctors in this position and published ap-
proximately thirty articles. He had performed over 4,000 competency and criminal 
responsibility examinations at the time of the re-sentencing hearing. Id. at 5 n.3.  
103
 Id. at 5.  
104
 Id. at 5–6. 
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pacity to "think rationally and act in a rational manner was substantial-
ly impaired."
105
 At the time of the crime, Fitzpatrick was emotionally 
and mentally operating as a "pre-teenager."
106
 
 
Linking the Expert testimony to the Facts on April 29, 1980 
 
The descriptions of Ernest’s behavior in the real estate office 
confirmed that he was mentally disordered at the time of the incident. 
Ernest waited in the waiting room, pacing, even though there was no 
obstruction between him and people in the back of the real estate of-
fice, until Mary Helen Blake came out to assist him. She immediately 
noticed that something was wrong with him. She thought he had been 
drinking or was "high on drugs" and tried to smell his breath and peer 
into his eyes to see if they were dilated.
107
 She said he was very "spac-
ey" and "very high, excited."
108
 He did not notice some of the people 
in the office, or see through the window the police cars going by, or 
hear various noises, although the other people in the office did. Blake 
said, "I don't think he really wanted to hurt us, he was just so nerv-
ous."
109
 Eric Shaw, the delivery boy, testified that Fitzpatrick seemed 
"excited," "scared all the way through the whole thing," "pretty wild," 
"jumpy," "panicky." "He did not know what to do. He just seemed like 
he didn't plan everything that happened."
110
 Joy Sibila, a registered 
nurse of twenty years who was working at the real estate office, was 
more blunt: she said he appeared to be "psychotic," sounded "child-
like," and behaved like a "psycho."
111
 Having gathered all of the evi-
dence we could, we prepared for the re-sentencing hearing.  
 
When is a Roll of Quarters Better Than a Pretrial Motion? 
 
The Sunday night before the Monday re-sentencing hearing 
was to begin, the Monday edition of the local paper came out, with a 
banner headline about the case and a story on the front page of the lo-
cal section.
112
 The article contained information that John Carr and I 
                                                          
105
 Id. at 6. 
106
 Id.  
107
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 10–11. 
108
 Id. at 11. 
109
 Id.   
110
 Id.  
111
 Id. at 11. 
112
 See Ginny Graybiel, Hearing May Decide Fate of Killer, PENSACOLA 
NEWS J., May 4, 1987, at 1B. 
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thought was extremely prejudicial to Ernest, including a description of 
his juvenile record.
113
 We prepared a motion to keep the papers out of 
the jury room, where the venire panel would gather, and called the 
judge asking him to grant it. He summarily denied it. I was despond-
ent. John looked at me, smiled, and said, “I have a van. How many 
quarters do you have?” On Monday morning there were no papers in 
the paper boxes surrounding the courthouse; we paid full price. 
 
Selecting a Jury 
 
In capital cases, voir dire may be the most important phase in 
the proceeding. It was in Fitzpatrick’s resentencing. The challenges 
were formidable. We began with the unique Florida rule that the jury 
sentencing recommendation in capital cases is by a simple majority. 
Escambia County residents overwhelmingly supported the death pen-
alty and those on the venire panel whose views substantially impaired 
their ability to follow the Florida law were struck for cause. This 
death-qualification process was not neutral. We lost many more anti-
death penalty jurors than the state did pro death penalty jurors.
114
 
Many of the anti-death penalty venire jurors whom the court struck 
were African Americans. In total, the court, acting “for cause,” and the 
prosecutor, exercising preemptory challenges, struck six of the eight 
African American venire jurors.
115
 
 
The Prosecutor’s Strike of Anita Jackson: “The other two blacks 
[on the jury] are better than she is, as far as black people go.”  
 
Anita Jackson was one of the six black jurors who was strick-
en. The only apparent basis for the prosecutor’s strike of Jackson was 
her race.
116
 When the state said it was using a preemptory challenge to 
                                                          
113
 See id.  
114
 Although the question appears balanced—“Would your views on the death 
penalty impair your ability to follow the state’s death penalty law?”—in practice, it 
disqualifies substantially more anti-death penalty jurors than pro-death penalty 
jurors. The state loses only the adamant “eye-for-an-eye” folks. The defense loses 
most of the jurors who have moral qualms about the death penalty, a larger group.  
115
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 47.  
116
 Jackson answered in the negative to the state's question, which it posed 
only to black jurors: "Do you believe that blacks are more likely to receive the death 
penalty than whites?” Id. She stated that she would listen to and apply the law; that 
she could vote for the death penalty; that murder would be a "serious crime" that 
would justify the death penalty (qualifying it by noting it would depend on "what 
exactly happened and why it happened”); and that she could recommend the death 
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strike Jackson, it had not yet stated its position on the other two blacks 
who tentatively had been seated on the jury, subject to “back 
strikes.”117 The following colloquy occurred:  
 
Millemann: [Objecting] The only reason that 
she's being stricken as a juror is because she's 
black, and I think this . . . falls squarely within 
[Batson].
118
  
Prosecutor: That, of course, is nonsense. 
The Court: Well, I don't think it's nonsense.
119
 
 
Then, this gem from the prosecutor, who now is a judge:
120
 “I 
think the other two blacks that are on here are better than she is, as far 
as black people go.”121 The judge overruled our objection, disclaiming 
any power to provide a remedy for a racial strike.
122
  
In the most remarkable voir dire ruling, however, the court 
overruled our “for cause” challenge to Harriet Majors. She said Paul 
Parks, whom Fitzpatrick shot in the real estate office, “and his wife, 
have just been among our very closest friends. We take vacations with 
them. We do all sorts of things together. We were extremely interested 
in [the Heist shooting] at the time [and] yes, we heard a great deal 
[about] it from Paul, Mr. Parks."
123
 Majors sat as a juror. The silver 
lining for us was that the ruling built reversible error into the record, 
assuring that there would be another sentencing hearing if necessary. It 
was a multi-year life insurance policy.  
                                                                                                                                         
penalty even if the defendant had mental disorders, depending on the "kind of 
emotional problems he had." Id. 
117
 Id. at 48. As the parties conduct voir dire, jurors are tentatively seated in 
the jury box in the order they are questioned. Counsel can seek to strike them before 
they are tentatively seated or reserve strikes until the 12 juror chairs and two 
alternate chairs are occupied. The peremptory challenges were allocated for jurors 
seated in the box (the majority), and two additional ones for the two alternate 
positions, one for the first alternate position, and one for the second. 
118
 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–90 (1986); see also State v. Neil, 
457 So. 2d 481, 486–87 (Fla. 1984) (enforcing Batson).  
119
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 48–49. 
120
 See David Rimmer, FIRST JUD. CIRCUIT CT. OF FLA., 
http://www.firstjudicialcircuit.org/judges/santa-rosa-county/david-rimmer  
(last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
121
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 48 (emphasis in original). 
122
 Under Batson, the judge could have stricken the venire panel and started 
again or seated the juror. See 476 U.S. at 100 n.24. 
123
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 53 (emphasis in original). 
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We “won” one of the other voir dire battles. It would prove to 
be a fatal mistake. Over the prosecutor’s objection, we leapfrogged the 
Reverend Tommie McGrew, an African American, into the jury from 
the second alternate position.
124
 He said, “There are some people I 
know [who] have got a mind of a child [but are] 50 years old.” Some-
one with a “child mind” should not be executed. This was our theory 
of the case. He was black. Ernest was black. It seemed like a perfect 
match. It proved to be just the opposite.  
 
Trying the Case 
 
           The state put on the evidence it had introduced in the original 
guilt-innocence trial. Over our objections, the prosecutor also cross-
examined our experts to introduce Fitzpatrick’s juvenile record, the 
very error, we argued unsuccessfully, that had persuaded the Florida 
Supreme Court to mandate the resentencing hearing.
125
 
We relied on three statutory mitigating circumstances and the 
absence of two aggravating circumstances. At the time of the crime, 
we argued, Fitzpatrick “was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance,”126 his “capacity . . . to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law was substantially impaired,”127 and although he was twenty years 
old, functionally and emotionally, he was a child.
128
 We also stressed 
that homicide was not “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,”129 and 
was not “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated man-
ner,”130 the two aggravating circumstances that many argue justify the 
death penalty. My students, John Carr, and I had developed this five-
factor theory of the case from the beginning and used it to guide our 
                                                          
124
 McGrew was in the second alternate’s position. It was our turn to exercise 
our peremptory challenges, and we had one strike on the second alternate position 
and one strike left on a juror in the group of twelve already in the jury box. The 
prosecutor had a peremptory challenge on the first alternate position. The issue was 
whether, when we struck the second alternate and then struck a juror in the group of 
twelve, McGrew would leapfrog over the first alternate position, precluding the State 
from striking him, and move onto the jury. We argued about this question for several 
minutes, with the judge ruling that McGrew would move into the group of twelve 
before the prosecutor could exercise his first alternate strike. 
125
 See supra pp. 238–41. 
126
 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(b) (1987). 
127
 See id. § 921.141(6)(f). 
128
 See id. § 921.141(6)(g). 
129
 See id. § 921.141(6)(h). 
130
 See id. § 921.141(6)(i). 
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fact finding, identify our pretrial motions, select our expert witnesses, 
and guide our re-sentencing hearing presentation of evidence and ar-
guments.  
We added, by the way, Fitzpatrick had not shot the deputy. The 
compelling evidence of this was admissible, we argued, even though 
the jury was bound by the original jury’s contrary finding, which the 
original jury had made beyond a reasonable doubt. There remained 
“lingering” or “residual” doubt, we contended, which was a legally 
cognizable non-statutory mitigating circumstance.
131
 The judge re-
fused to instruct the jury on this theory, but allowed us to present the 
evidence in response to the state’s case, which walked the jury, step-
by-step, through the complete incident in the real estate office. We 
hoped the jury got the point. 
 
Closing Argument 
 
We made our arguments. The state argued that Fitzpatrick had 
shot the deputy sheriff, and if not, so what? He had directly caused the 
death of Heist. Fitzpatrick, the prosecutor argued, had plenty of “walk-
ing around sense,” and if he was crazy, he was dangerous crazy. Quot-
ing the Old Testament, the prosecutor, who was a lay minister in his 
church, then approached the Reverend Tommie McGrew, saying, 
 
Now [Fitzpatrick] wants you to think he is cra-
zy all right. That’s one of the oldest defenses in 
the book. If you have ever read the [O]ld 
[T]estament you know in First Samuel, Chapter 
21, that King David used that very defense to 
escape from his enemies when he was going to 
be captured. He pretended to be mad and . . . let 
the spittle run down upon his beard . . . .
132
  
 
                                                          
131
 The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the issue of lingering doubt twice 
without clearly resolving the issue, but it has strongly suggested that it does not ac-
cept the argument. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1988); Oregon 
v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 525 (2006). 
132
 Transcript of Record of Re-sentencing at 1097, State v. Fitzpatrick, No. 80-
1281-E (Fla. Escambia Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 2, 1987). Fearing capture, King David is 
described in Samuel I of the Old Testament as having created the false picture of 
insanity by adopting various crazy behaviors such as scribbling on doors and 
drooling over his beard. 1 Samuel 21:13. 
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The ruse worked for King David, the prosecutor said, arguing the jury 
should not let Fitzpatrick get away with the same ploy. 
 
The Crying Juror 
 
About three hours later, the jury returned, led back in by an Af-
rican American woman juror who was crying. No one on the jury 
looked at us. We knew without being told. The recommendation was 
death. It was by a vote of seven-to-five. One changed vote in our fa-
vor, and we would have won. But, we had lost. The local newspaper 
reported the result. “By a single vote, an Escambia County Circuit 
Court jury recommended Monday that convicted murderer Ernest 
Fitzpatrick, Jr. die in Florida’s electric chair. Fitzpatrick, 27, who had 
stretched restlessly during the hearing, made faces, muttered, and was 
shushed by his father, looked blank when he heard the 7 to 5 recom-
mendation.”133 The article summarized John Carr’s argument that 
“Fitzpatrick was an immature, mentally ill, brain-damaged young man 
who deserved mercy,”134 and noted “FBI ballistics expert Richard 
Poppleton’s surprise testimony” that “the bullet fragment that hit 
Heist’s head, resulting in his death, matched a bullet that deputies be-
lieve was shot by Sgt. Ed Smith, a second officer at the scene.”135 The 
article quoted from the prosecutor’s argument too: “Deputy Heist paid 
the ultimate price. Shouldn’t [Fitzpatrick]?”136 
After the jury announced its verdict, Ernest tried to reassure us. 
“First time round, I didn’t get any votes; this time you got me five,” he 
said. I really didn’t feel any better. I felt worse that night when John 
and I ran into a court employee who had heard the jury through the 
door of the deliberation room. He asked us if we could “hear the yell-
ing.” We said “no.” “Do you know who was leading the charge for ex-
ecution?” “No,” we said.” “It was the Reverend Tommie McGrew,” he 
said, the juror that we had fought to put on the jury, apparently apply-
ing the death penalty according to the Old Testament. It appeared our 
misjudgment about the Reverend would cost Ernest his life.  
Lawyers who tell stories about their cases often season them 
with macho. I can’t. I was devastated by the sentencing recommenda-
tion. I had a recurring dream. I was preparing our witnesses for the 
                                                          
133
 Ginny Graybiel, Jury Says Killer Should be Executed, PENSACOLA NEWS 
J., May 12, 1987, at 1A. 
134
 Id. 
135
 Id.  
136
 Id.  
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hearing, optimistic about the outcome. Slowly, I would wake up, with 
the eventual flood of consciousness jolting me awake. The State of 
Florida was going to kill Ernest Fitzpatrick.  
 
“I kicked the door open for you.” 
 
We prepared to ask the judge to overrule the jury’s recommen-
dation and impose a life sentence. Florida judges do overrule capital 
sentencing recommendations, but then, they did so more frequently by 
overruling the life recommendations of judges and imposing death.
137
  
At the judicial sentencing hearing, I sat next to Barbara Fitzpatrick, 
Ernest’s oldest sister.  The judge began by finding the same five ag-
gravating circumstances that he found after the first sentencing hear-
ing.
138
 He then turned to the statutory mitigating circumstances. Find-
ing that "the capital felony was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," the 
court said: "Although expert testimony at the trial established that de-
fendant was in complete control of his behavior, the expert testimony 
at the sentencing trial established that defendant was acting under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."
139
  
With regard to whether the capacity of the defendant to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired, the court said:  
 
Expert testimony at the trial established that de-
fendant was fully aware of what he was doing, 
knew that it was wrong, and could conform his 
conduct to do right had he so desired. This tes-
timony was contradicted during the sentencing 
trial, and based on this expert testimony, the 
Court finds that even though defendant was 
sane at the time of the capital felony, his capaci-
ty was substantially impaired.
140
 
 
                                                          
137
 See LaTour R. Lafferty, Florida’s Capital Sentencing Jury Override: 
Whom Should We Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 463, 476 (1995) (noting the increasing tendency of judges in Florida to override 
jury recommendations of life-sentences in favor of the death penalty).  
138
 Fitzpatrick v. State, 437 So. 2d at 1072, 1077 (Fla. 1983). 
139
 Sentencing Order at 2, State v. Fitzpatrick, No. 80-1281-E (Fla. Escambia 
Cnty. Co. Ct. July 2, 1987).  
140
 Id. at 2–3. 
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Finally, concerning the youthful age mitigating circumstance, 
the court said: "Defendant was twenty years of age and had been on 
his own for several years after being rejected by his family. However, 
expert testimony as to defendant’s borderline intelligence and emo-
tional problems establish that defendant was operating at the level of 
maturity of a juvenile."
141
  
Having found that, at the time of the crime, Fitzpatrick was ex-
tremely mentally or emotionally disturbed, substantially impaired, and 
a functional juvenile, the court then sentenced him—to death. It said, 
   
It is, therefore ORDERED that the Defendant 
Ernest Fitzpatrick, Jr., under Count Four of the 
indictment for the crime of murder in the first 
degree, be committed to the custody of the De-
partment of Corrections of the State of Florida 
to be punished by death in the electric chair or 
as otherwise provided by law.
142
  
 
I was close to elated. I knew the judge was going to accept the 
jury’s death recommendation, but I did not expect him to embody our 
theory of the case in his findings. When I shared the “good news” with 
Barbara, she looked at me with disbelief, and assured me my optimism 
was naïve. This was Florida. The judge’s opinion assured that Ernest 
would be executed.  
The judge, however, did not seem to think so. I stopped by be-
fore leaving Pensacola to thank him for allowing me to represent Ern-
est and for his “many courtesies to out-of-state counsel.”143 He re-
sponded: “I kicked the door open for you.” I told him I understood, 
and thanked him for it. I felt like saying: “You are not running for re-
election, why didn’t you just kick it down?” But, I didn’t, expecting 
that I would be returning to Pensacola for another resentencing, per-
haps before him again.
144
  
What had the judge done and why? His findings sent an unmis-
takable message to the Florida Supreme Court. Imagine the message as 
a cover letter from him to the Florida Supreme Court accompanying 
our appeal. This imaginary letter might read:  
                                                          
141
 Id. at 3. 
142
 Id. (emphasis in original).  
143
 Good advocacy often is credible insincerity. 
144
 Again, I believed the decision, over our objection, to seat Mrs. Majors on 
the jury guaranteed that the death sentence would be reversed. See supra pp. 253–54. 
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Dear Florida Supreme Court,  
 
Attached is my death order in this case. 
It affirms the jury’s recommendation. Please re-
verse both of us. We are both wrong. Mr. Fitz-
patrick is a mentally ill, functional juvenile. He 
doesn’t deserve death. I have to live in this 
community, however, as do the jurors. Fitzpat-
rick killed a good man who was a popular depu-
ty sheriff. You have, effectively, life-tenure. 
You do not have to live here. Please rescue Mr. 
Fitzpatrick and me.    
 
We had one thing left to do before I left Pensacola. We asked a 
respected Florida sociologist, Michael Radalet, to dig into his Florida 
death penalty databank to create a statistical profile for Ernest that we 
could use on appeal, and we filed a motion for sentencing reconsidera-
tion to get the information into the appellate record. Radalet found that 
from 1972, when Florida reinstated the death penalty, through the time 
of Fitzpatrick’s resentencing, Florida judges had imposed 490 death 
penalties.
145
 Fitzpatrick’s case was one of only two in which the judge 
had found the two mental illness mitigating circumstances and the 
youthful age mitigator, and the Florida Supreme Court had reversed 
the death penalty in the other case.
146
 In only nine cases had the trial 
judge found the two mental illness mitigating circumstances, and the 
Florida Supreme Court had reversed the death penalty in six of the 
nine cases.
147
  
Our point, intended for the Florida Supreme Court, was that 
trial judges in Florida did not impose death penalties after finding that 
the defendants had killed when they were mentally ill juveniles, and 
when they did, the Court reversed the death penalty. Let me be clear: 
there are substantial numbers of death-sentenced prisoners in Florida 
who were mentally ill and young when they killed. Judges, however, 
do not so find just before they order them executed, unless, that is, they 
are hoping to be reversed.  
 
 
 
                                                          
145
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 21, at 18.  
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. at 18 n.13. 
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The Florida Supreme Court Responds 
 
My students and I largely wrote the appellate brief, although 
we asked an excellent Florida lawyer, Edward Stafman, to argue the 
appeal. In a per curiam opinion, the Florida Supreme Court accepted 
the trial judge’s invitation.148 It concluded that “Fitzpatrick's actions 
were those of a seriously emotionally disturbed man-child, not those of 
a cold-blooded, heartless killer.”149 It reversed the death penalty and 
instead of remanding for another sentencing hearing, imposed a life 
sentence with the possibility of parole.
150
 Finding that the death penal-
ty was disproportionate in this case, the Court said, “The record on re-
sentencing is replete with evidence of Fitzpatrick's substantially im-
paired capacity, his extreme emotional disturbance, and low emotional 
age. Those present at the scene of the shooting testified that Fitzpatrick 
appeared ‘psychotic,’ ‘high,’ ‘spacey,’ ‘panicky’ and ‘wild.’" 151 The 
Court described the expert testimony as “[t]he unanimous opinion” 
that ‘Fitzpatrick suffered from extreme emotional and mental disturb-
ance and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law was substantially impaired,” and “that his “emotional age 
was between nine and twelve years old.”152 The Court added, In con-
trast [to the mitigating evidence], the aggravating circumstances of 
heinous, atrocious and cruel, and cold, calculated and premeditated are 
conspicuously absent.”153 The Court emphasized “that the record on 
resentencing is substantially different from that of the original sentenc-
ing,”154 and that “this additional evidence shows the mitigating cir-
cumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and thus renders 
the death penalty inappropriate.”155  
                                                          
148
 Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809, 810 (1988). 
149
 Id. at 812. 
150
 Id. 
151
 Id.  
152
 Id. at 811–12. 
153
 Id. at 812. 
154
 Fitzpatrick, 527 So. 2d at 812. 
155
 Id. The Court ignored our argument that Fitzpatrick had not shot Heist, 
adopting a statement of facts from the original appeal in which the Court had 
concluded that Fitzpatrick shot Heist. Id. at 810. Perhaps the Court thought that was 
true, or maybe that with the reversal of the death penalty and judicial imposition of a 
sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, the point was now 
legally moot. The State likely would argue that even if it was true that Fitzpatrick did 
not fire the fatal bullet, he would still have faced a first degree felony murder charge, 
a capital offense, because an innocent person was killed during the commission of 
both a robbery and kidnapping. See State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 551 (Fla. Dist. 
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When I got the news, I was in Aberdeen, Scotland, teaching in 
the law school’s summer exchange program. I made sure Ernest got 
the news and then cried tears of relief that it was over and tears of 
happiness that the Court got it right.  
At its core, this is a lawyer’s story told from a lawyer’s per-
spective about the essential tool of law practice, the theory of the case. 
It is the structural story, which synthesizes everything from initial fact 
investigation, through pretrial motions, trial preparation, witness selec-
tion, voir dire, and arguments and presentations at trial and on appeal. 
As I tell my first semester students in my criminal law/legal analysis 
and writing course, it is through this story, the theory of the case, that 
lawyers “write” appellate opinions. This is an important counterweight 
in the first year curriculum. Students tend to think law is delivered 
from appellate judges, from the top of the mountain, in the same way 
God gave the Ten Commandments to Moses.
156
 Our accepted method 
of teaching in the first year reinforces this view, except we often point 
out how the appellate judges got God’s message wrong, and occasion-
ally, how God, himself, got it wrong. 
The Fitzpatrick case study shows students how to construct a 
theory of the case, fact by fact and argument by argument, and how 
this lawyer-constructed theory of the case can become the core of an 
appellate opinion. We knew Ernest was a man-child in 1984 when we 
read his letter. The challenge was to get the Florida Supreme Court to 
say those words, as they did in 1988. This was four years and approx-
imately 2,000 hours of my time, and many multiples of that of my stu-
dents’ time, after we had received Ernest’s letter. Demonstrating the 
steps in this process to first semester students, from initial letter 
through final appellate opinion, is vitally important, especially since 
the pervasive first year educational model relies on disembodied ap-
pellate opinions and commentary, rather than case studies.   
As important, the Fitzpatrick case study shows law students 
why it is essential to be disciplined and rigorous in learning the law, in 
learning how to develop facts, and in learning how to engage in the di-
alectic that combines the two to create a story—the theory of the case. 
It was such a story that John Carr, my students and I constructed and 
then told to two levels of Florida courts that saved Ernest Fitzpatrick’s 
life.  
                                                                                                                                         
Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the felony-murder statute applies “when an innocent 
person is killed as a sequential result of . . . one or more persons acting in furtherance 
of an intent or attempt to commit one of the felonies in such a statute”). 
156
 See Exodus 19: 20–21, 20: 7–17; Deuteronomy 5: 11–21.  
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IV. OTHER PERSONAL CASE STUDIES AND STORIES WITH DIFFERENT 
VOICES 
 
I could describe each of the case studies that follows with the 
same detail as the Fitzpatrick case, but, given space limitations, here 
are the summaries:   
 
A. Stories That Clients Tell on Their Own Behalf:  
The Battered Women Clemency Project 
 
Sometimes, the most effective legal stories are those clients tell 
directly as advocates for themselves. Lawyers can help them tell their 
stories. In one project in which I was involved, four women incarcer-
ated for killing their abusive male partners told their stories in a video 
called “A Plea for Justice.”157 They spoke powerfully and directly, in 
this case to the Maryland governor and legislature, as part of a group 
clemency project that we began at the law school in 1987.
158
 The video 
helped to persuade Governor William Donald Schaefer to grant clem-
ency to eight abused women,
159
 and it helped persuade the legislature 
to enact a law authorizing courts to admit histories of abuse in criminal 
prosecutions of abused defendants.
160
 The role of the lawyer here is 
subsidiary. She is not the story-teller, but rather the coach, advisor, and 
advocate for the client, who is the story-teller. I use a case study based 
                                                          
157
 Videotape: A Plea for Justice (The Public Justice Center, Domestic 
Violence Task Force 1990) (on file with the Thurgood Marshall Law Library, 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law). 
158
 Sharon Krevor-Weisbaum, then both a student of mine and the Executive 
Director of the Public Justice Center, was a leader in beginning this project. Rachel 
Wohl and Carolyn Jacobs, working through the Public Justice Center, and especially 
its the Domestic Violence Task Force, and the staff at the House of Ruth were the 
leaders in making the project successful. In the beginning, Karen Czapanskiy and I 
supervised a group of law students who interviewed many women prisoners to iden-
tify the best candidates for clemency. See Laura Lippman, Battered Women Hoping 
for Chance at a New Defense, EVENING SUN, May 14, 1990, at M1; Michael A. 
Millemann, Editorial, Commutations: Justice and Mercy, BALT. SUN, Mar. 31, 1991, 
at D1; Thomas W. Waldron, Governor: Women Were “Pushed to the Brink,” 
EVENING SUN, Feb. 20, 1991, at M1. 
159
 See Howard Schneider, Md. to Free Abused Women; Schaefer Commutes 8 
Terms, Citing Violence, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1991, at A1. 
160
 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (West 2012) 
(authorizing courts to admit evidence of “battered spouse syndrome” in homicide 
and serious assault prosecutions). An important rationale for clemency was that the 
women had not been able to present their histories of abuse as a mitigating factor. 
See Schneider, supra note 159. 
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on this project to teach self-defense, among other things, in my first 
year criminal law course and to explore law reform strategies. 
   
B. Stories That Clients Tell Retrospectively: State v. Johnson 
 
Clients also can tell their stories retrospectively. The clemency 
project grew out of a criminal defense clinic in which my students and 
I represented abused women who were charged with murder for killing 
their abusers. In a case study based on one of these cases, I inter-
viewed Ms. Yvonne Johnson, a former client, ten years after we had 
represented her in a murder case. She had asserted self-defense, ex-
plaining that she came upon her boyfriend unexpectedly after she had 
evicted him from her house, and he chased her, knocked her down, and 
began choking her (or so she could have reasonably concluded) before 
she stabbed him twice. One wound was superficial; the other happened 
to penetrate his carotid artery. She was devastated because she loved 
the man she had killed and they had had a child together. In 1985, on 
the morning of trial, my two students and I negotiated an Alford plea
161
 
for involuntary manslaughter, with a five-year suspended sentence and 
two years probation. She went home to her children from the court-
house and has never been in trouble since.  
Ten years later, I asked her to come back to the law school for 
a videotaped interview that I could use in teaching with her case. She 
readily agreed since we had maintained friendly contact over the years. 
She was one of my favorite clients, which is part of the teaching mate-
rial. Her reflections about the homicide, the case, her life since then, 
and the students who had represented her ten years before were fasci-
nating.  
The homicide had changed her life dramatically. She described 
being stalked by a cousin of the man she had killed, her post-traumatic 
stress, and living in virtual self-imposed isolation. She described the 
agony of telling their son, when he was five years old, that she had 
killed his father and why she had done so.  
What did we, her lawyers, do right? A lot, she said. More im-
portant, what did we do wrong? Laughing, she recalled when her sis-
ter, who was an important witness, angrily kicked two students out of 
her house. They had asked her “Do you think she planned to do it?” 
The sister’s response: “What the hell do you mean? You are supposed 
                                                          
161
 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (establishing that a 
defendant can plead guilty without admitting guilt). 
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to be her lawyers, get out of here.”162 This story provides an important 
teaching moment about how lawyers should talk to clients and their 
families. Communicating allegiance and support is critically im-
portant. Clients must feel that their lawyers are unequivocally on their 
side.  
There also was Yvonne’s assessment of the multiple moot 
courts we did to prepare her for trial, which we thought were so im-
portant. “You mean those pretend things (laughing)?” She said they 
did not and could not prepare her for the embarrassment, risks, and 
anxiety associated with a trial, which provided another important 
teaching moment. We might have enhanced the effectiveness of the 
preparation by conducting it in the courthouse, not in the law school, 
and showing Yvonne an actual trial. But, basically, we had to realize 
the limits of what we could do to try to pre-determine the result. In the 
end, it would be up to the jury.  
Most poignant, she recounted how her brother-in-law had 
killed another sister of hers. Johnson had killed her abusive live-in 
boyfriend. Her sister had married hers and then had taken all possible 
legal steps to protect herself from his escalating violence. The sister 
had called the police, criminally prosecuted the cases, pressed for in-
carceration and treatment (he was a drug addict and alcoholic), ob-
tained a civil put-out order, and finally moved out. Her husband 
tracked her down, pulled her from her second floor apartment to the 
street, and slashed her to death with a knife.  
The stories of these two sisters offer stark contrasts and in-
sights into the racial and gender bias that battered women face, in what 
could be a critical legal studies course. Yvonne killed, not waiting to 
be delivered by the law, and is alive. Her sister did everything possible 
under the law, waiting to be delivered, and is dead.  
The most important feature of Yvonne’s retrospective inter-
view, however, is the opportunity it gives the students to first realize, 
and then think about, their prejudgments. In the video, the students 
witness Yvonne’s warmth, good humor, and love for her children. In 
the video, they see that she is a good person and a good mother. These 
observations were just as true in 1984. In her paper record, however, 
she appears tough, aggressive, and street-wise, with a record for as-
saults. This is the Yvonne the students know before the video. At age 
fourteen, Yvonne became the functional mother of her younger sib-
lings when both parents abandoned the family. In the 1960s and early 
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1970s, police twice came to her house to arrest two of her younger sib-
lings. She stepped in the way and was convicted and sentenced to pris-
on for conduct that was both non-violent and maternal. Her record was 
an indictment not of her but of the administration of “justice” at this 
time in Baltimore. I know this, because I practiced at this time in Bal-
timore. The students do not. 
When the students see the videotape, there is stunned silence 
and a palpable sense of embarrassment. Uniformly, the students ex-
press surprise about the person they see in the video, with comments 
that clinical teachers are used to hearing after students first visit clients 
(e.g., “she seems really nice,” “a good person and mother”). The video 
challenges popular stereotypes and invites students to be skeptical 
about record descriptions of people at their worst moments. This is vi-
tal when clients are either invisible or are undeveloped stick figures in 
the snippets of appellate opinions that still comprise the bulk of first 
year legal education.   
I use Yvonne’s case study to teach self-defense in criminal law, 
as the basis for the students’ first writing assignment in my legal anal-
ysis and writing course, and for the larger lessons that I describe 
above.   
 
C. Stories that Students Construct from Case Studies:  
Filling in the Blanks 
 
There is another type of story in the case studies with which I 
teach. It is one that clinical students begin to write through their legal 
work and classroom students subsequently finish in a special theater 
course when they write the story as a play. The foundation of the play 
is a clinical case. My theater course co-teachers and I have used two 
cases of wrongfully convicted, life-sentenced prisoners to co-teach 
these drama courses.
163
 In one case, we persuaded Governor Robert 
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 The course is called Lawyers, Legal Systems and Their Social Context, and 
my co-teachers were Robert Bowie, Jr., a lawyer who created his own firm, Bowie 
and Jensen, and who also is a playwright, and Elliott Rauh, Managing Director of the 
Baltimore-based Single Carrot Theater. Their inspired teaching, and in Elliott’s case 
direction, have made the courses extremely successful. See Law and Legal Systems 
and their Social Context, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/program/curriculum/catalog/course_detail
s.html?coursenum=581D, (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); Robert R. Bowie, Jr., BOWIE & 
JENSEN, http://www.bowie-jensen.com/lawyers/robert-bowie-jr/ (last visited Jan. 5, 
2013); Elliot Rauh, SINGLE CARROT THEATRE, 
http://singlecarrot.com/ensemble/elliott_rauh (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
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Ehrlich to commute the prisoner’s sentence to time served so he could 
be immediately paroled, after thirty-six years of wrongful incarcera-
tion.
164
 The students wrote the play after he had been released. In the 
other case, the client was still locked up when the students wrote their 
play. Subsequently, after he had served almost thirty years in prison, 
Governor O’Malley granted clemency to him based on the extraordi-
nary work of my colleague, Professor Renee Hutchins, and her stu-
dents.
165
  
What is interesting about the plays is that they focus on the 
back stories that try to explain why the two innocent prisoners were 
wrongly convicted of homicides and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
These are hybrid stories, part clinical facts and part re-construction of 
what probably happened, to explain the miscarriages of justice.  
In the “what probably happened” column in the first case, the 
students explored the relationship between the 1968 riots in Baltimore 
after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King and the arrest in 1968 
and conviction in 1969 of the defendant, Walter Arvinger, who is 
black. The play also examined the grossly incompetent performance of 
defense counsel. This was a capital trial. The whole transcript, includ-
ing trial and sentencing, was ninety-three pages long. The trial took 
about half a day. On the face of the transcript, Arvinger was innocent. 
I had never seen anything like it before. The play provided a better ex-
planation of what probably happened than did the record. 
In the other case, of Mark Farley Grant, the theatrical theme 
was what the community knows. The community in which Grant and 
the co-defendant lived knew from the beginning that Grant was inno-
cent. They knew that the family of the co-defendant had threatened to 
kill the lead prosecution witness unless he falsely claimed Grant was 
the shooter. The play considers why this knowledge did not penetrate 
the criminal justice system. Professor Hutchins also discovered that the 
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 See Lee Hockstader, Editorial, A Stain on Maryland; Walter Arvinger Spent 
36 Years in Prison for a Crime He did not Commit, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at 
A19. See also Michael A. Millemann & Steven D. Schwinn, Teaching Legal 
Research and Writing with Actual Legal Work: Extending Clinical Education Into 
the First Year, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 441 (2006) (providing a more detailed account 
of the case). Students in several courses, including a legal writing course and a post-
conviction clinic, worked on Mr. Arvinger’s case. I created the post-conviction clinic 
in part to provide a structure to represent Mr. Arvinger after he wrote to me, 
claiming, thirty-four years into his life sentence, to be innocent. In fact, he was. 
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 Baltimore Sun journalist Dan Rodricks wrote several articles protesting the 
prisoner’s incarceration and advocating his release. For the most recent article, see 
Dan Rodricks, Road Back for Mark Farley Grant Starts on the Early Bus, BALT. 
SUN, Sept. 9, 2012, at 3A. 
Millemann 2/18/2013  7:20 PM 
2012] CASE STUDIES AND THE CLASSROOM 267 
prosecutor knew that the co-defendant had flunked a polygraph exam 
before the prosecutor entered into a plea agreement with him and put 
him on the stand to testify against Grant. There was a lot of dramatic 
material to work with here.  
Both plays engaged the students in thinking more broadly 
about the criminal justice system and its relationship to local commu-
nities than occurs in most traditional criminal law courses and semi-
nars. The cases also posed an array of professional responsibility and 
professionalism issues, including delivery of legal services issues, that 
the students analyzed in writing and presenting the plays.    
Most interesting to me, the students who wrote the play about 
Grant when he was still confined commented on the sense of responsi-
bility they felt to him as they wrote and performed the play. It was 
akin to how clinical students describe the commitments they have to 
their clients. In this respect, this story-telling, theater course had some 
of the hallmarks of a clinic.  
 
D. The Stories that the Other Actors in the Cases Tell 
 
This in some ways is the best teaching material. It is unscripted 
and uncontrolled.  
In Fitzpatrick, there is the chief assistant attorney general who 
learned about deterrence when he was deterred by the death penalty, 
he says, from killing his wife; and the prosecutor who talked, Old Tes-
tament minister-to-minister, to the juror and won a death penalty; and 
the Atticus Finch lawyer, John Carr, who put his solo practice on hold 
to try to save Ernest Fitzpatrick’s life; and the judge, who was not go-
ing to run for re-election, but could not do what he knew he should do, 
but then did it indirectly by inviting—one might say demanding—that 
the Florida Supreme Court do it instead. And, there are all the subsidi-
ary lessons, including those contained in the Florida Execution Guide-
lines, which conscript in the killing of a person, all of the treatment, 
counseling and ministerial, as well as custodial staff, with all of the 
professional and ethical issues that this poses. 
There are many other stories that might be interesting, for ex-
ample, why the prosecutors in Arvinger and Grant sought convictions; 
why the defense counsel in these cases did not establish their clients’ 
innocence; and why the trial judges and juries convicted both Arvinger 
and Grant.    
What can be said, based on all of this, is that in all of these cas-
es, the external actors—opposing counsel, judges, and other actors 
(like governors)—presented challenging moments and good teaching 
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material. Their stories were an important part of the students’ educa-
tion.  
 
V. TEACHING 
 
A. What Personal Case Studies Can Teach 
 
Personal case studies have many pedagogical strengths, some 
of which I have suggested. They bring forgotten clients into the class-
room; reaffirm the idealistic reasons many students come to law 
school; use practice to organize and critique theory and theory to or-
ganize and critique practice; introduce students to the work of lawyers, 
with examples of both good and bad legal work and good and bad 
lawyers and, thus, teach professional responsibility; provide several 
dimensions of critical legal theory to evaluate legal doctrine and pro-
cess; and explore both the potential and limits of law.
166
  
It is especially important to teach with such case studies in the 
first semester when our students are being acculturated to the roles of 
lawyers and the law, and in the second semester, when the flames of 
idealism often flicker. Many of the arguments I offer in support of us-
ing case studies in first-year courses also supported the creation of our 
legal theory and practice program and its placement in the second se-
mester of the first year.
167
 Other professional schools, especially busi-
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 See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1739–42 (1993); Nancy Levit, Legal Storytelling: The Theory 
And The Practice– Reflective Writing Across The Curriculum, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING 
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Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1179 (1992) 
(“In [Legal Theory and Practice/Civil Procedure (LTP/CP)], I made an effort to 
replace a vision of professional responsibility based solely on individual rights with 
one that includes an ‘ethic of care.’”); Homer C. La Rue, Developing an Identity of 
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ness schools, use case studies to teach first year students for many of 
these same reasons.
168
  
I cannot overstate the importance the students attach to the cli-
ents in the case studies, including Ernest Fitzpatrick, Jr., Walter 
Arvinger,
169
 Mark Farley Grant,
170
 and Yvonne Johnson.
171
 It helped 
that the latter three either were able to come to class (Arvinger and 
Johnson) or to communicate by phone (Grant) with the students who 
were studying their cases in the various courses. The clients helped 
students to appreciate the very real and, at times, extraordinary conse-
quences of law; to assess the exercises of discretion by lawyers, judg-
es, and juries; and to challenge popular stereotypes in important ways. 
In a casebook-based curriculum, the case studies provide the only real 
introduction to clients that many students will receive in the first year. 
The case studies also offer the opportunities for real-world cas-
es to critique substantive law and process. Justice John Marshall Har-
lan II is one of my favorite Justices. As a law student, I watched him 
during arguments, nearly blind, peering at text inches away and asking 
the occasional penetrating question. In 1970, he wrote the opinion of 
the Court upholding standard-less death penalty schemes. He said, “To 
identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and 
their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these 
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied 
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond pre-
sent human ability.”172 I agree with his skepticism, although it leads 
me to reject the death penalty, not accept it as Harlan did.  
In discussing the Fitzpatrick case, I ask my students whether 
they agree with Justice Harlan. Can we develop a fair system of capital 
punishment based on before-the-fact criteria? Are the Florida aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances such criteria? Do they fairly sort 
out who should live and who should die?  
I also ask my students what the Fitzpatrick case teaches about 
the process in capital cases. Florida based much of its law upon the 
American Law Institute’s (“ALI’s”) capital sentencing provisions, in 
                                                                                                                                         
gain a deeper understanding of lawyering as a human enterprise in which human 
interests and values are taken to be of primary importance”). 
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 See Using Case Studies to Teach, BOS. UNIV. CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN 
TEACHING, http://www.bu.edu/ceit/teaching-resources/in-the-classroom/using-case-
studies-to-teach/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
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 See supra p. 266. 
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 See supra pp. 266–67. 
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 See supra pp. 263–65. 
172
 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).   
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the original version of the Model Penal Code.
173
 In 2009, the ALI re-
versed field and deleted the death penalty provisions.
174
 It did so in 
major part because of its loss of confidence in the process by which 
capital sentences are imposed, especially the problems in providing 
competent representation at all phases of a case to capital defend-
ants.
175
 Fitzpatrick certainly informs that conversation.  
This case also provides a powerful critique of the M’Naghten 
test of legal insanity, including of the possible human “costs” associat-
ed with it. If Fitzpatrick had been found legally insane after the juve-
nile incident, and provided institutional treatment and aftercare, would 
Heist have been killed?   
The case studies also can incorporate critical legal studies into 
mainstream courses. We can lecture about the power of the local 
community to nullify law and the impact on the administration of jus-
tice of race, class, and gender, but the case studies that I use give stu-
dents the opportunity to discover these lessons themselves and discuss 
them in class. By itself, Fitzpatrick raises many of these issues.  
The case studies offer an array of professionalism and skills 
lessons, as well.
176
 They include what clinical teachers and second and 
third-year clinical students can do to model the best ethical practices of 
lawyers. This is one of the most powerful ways to teach professional 
responsibility to first year students. 
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 Fitzpatrick, for example, presents an array of professionalism issues, in-
cluding the decision of the local public defender to disqualify his office from repre-
senting Fitzpatrick, the ineffectiveness of Fitzpatrick’s initial trial and appellate law-
yers, the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the test results on the bullet, our 
decision to represent Fitzpatrick, and John Carr’s willingness to put his small firm 
practice on virtual hold while he prepared and tried the resentencing case. Johnson 
presents professionalism issues as well. The case turned on why she had a knife 
when she saw her abuser, and where he had his hands—around her shoulders or 
neck—when she stabbed him by pushing him off. These critical issues presented eth-
ical issues in interviewing her, preparing her for trial, and presenting her testimony at 
trial (if there had been a trial). There are many trial practice and tactical issues in the-
se cases as well.   
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B. The Challenges of Teaching with Personal Case Studies 
 
In using stories to teach, the major ground rule is that the in-
formation, materials, and accounts must be factually accurate. This 
promise is easier made than kept when the teacher, who was the law-
yer in the matter, has confidential information or information that re-
mains sensitive, although the case is over. There are several ways to 
deal with this issue. If the confidential information undermines the ac-
curacy of the story, do not use that case as a study. Be explicit about 
the limits of the information you are providing. Make it clear that as 
the lawyer, you cannot disclose confidential information. Explain why. 
In exceptional cases, you may wish to seek additional client consent to 
use information after the case is concluded, as I did to use the video-
taped interview of Yvonne Johnson as teaching material.  
Another danger of personal case studies is the story-teller’s bi-
as.  When a lawyer/teacher teaches with her own cases, she becomes 
part of the teaching material. Insofar as the lawyer/teacher is modeling 
good behaviors, this is a good thing, but it is not good if the profes-
sor’s account is biased and students are dissuaded from participating 
because they believe the professor will resent their conflicting views.  
I use three methods to try to limit the bias in my accounts of 
cases. I accept that I cannot eliminate all of it. First, I quote extensive-
ly from the opinion(s) in the case, the most important check on my bias 
(but not bias generally), and the other parts of the written record of the 
case. Second, I develop simulation exercises from the case studies and 
put students in roles in the cases (e.g., as prosecutors and defense 
counsel), asking them to make the best possible competing arguments 
from the facts. I make sure that I reinforce the opposing arguments in 
the cases. Third, I role-play the opposing counsel in the case as well. 
For example, in the Johnson case, I role-play the prosecutor and con-
duct a cross-examination of her that highlights the strong parts of the 
State’s case. I ask the students whether as prosecutors, knowing that 
they could do this cross-examination, they would. This produces inter-
esting discussions about the role of the prosecutor.  
Finally, I try to teach with the mistakes I made as a lawyer in 
the cases as well as with what I might have done right. In Fitzpatrick, 
one of these mistakes was our decision to put Reverend McGrew on 
the jury.
177
 Did we give too much weight to potential racial identity? 
Did we play with fire, and lose, because of our limited understanding 
of the Old Testament? Most important, how as lawyers should we have 
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prepared for this possibility to avoid making mistakes? The teacher 
should lead a discussion critiquing the performance of the lawyer, 
even when they are the same person.   
These are some ways in which I try to respond to the problems 
of teaching with personal case studies while using the many positive 
features of them to teach students things they cannot learn from tradi-
tional casebooks. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
After submitting this Article to the Journal, I flew to Florida 
and visited Ernest Fitzpatrick. He was twenty years old in 1980. He 
now is fifty-three. He is in a prison outside Tallahassee, with rolls of 
razor wire between the fences like those I saw in the prison that 
housed Ernest in 1984. We talked for several hours. Unsurprisingly, he 
is largely the same person I knew from the 1980s, with the same basic 
personality and emotional features. I am sure he thought the same was 
true of me. He has moved progressively through several prisons, has 
an excellent disciplinary record (with no infractions for over twenty-
three years), and has successfully completed an array of prison pro-
grams.  
I went to see him for two reasons. First, I wanted to tell him 
about this Article and ask him for his permission to let me publish it. 
Form consent provisions in written retainer agreements are adequate, if 
explained, for most clients. For obvious reasons, I wanted to do more 
for Ernest. He agreed to the Article. 
Second, of all the cases I have handled in my career, this one 
seems the most unfinished. I wanted to see if there were any more we 
could do for him legally at this point, specifically, whether we could 
help him with parole. As always in this case, the Florida criminal jus-
tice system is challenging. The parole commission has given Ernest a 
presumptive parole date of 2139, that is not 26 but 126 years from 
now. That converts his sentence from life with parole to life without 
parole, in apparent contravention of Florida legislative judgment and 
the decision of the Florida Supreme court in his case. Is this illegal? It 
should be, but I do not know what we will find. I have agreed that we 
will explore all of the legal arguments, and we have re-opened his case 
in the clinic.  
In this case, as in all of the cases and maters that clinical teach-
ers handle, we teach by what we do. In this Article, I argue that faculty 
can use personal case studies to teach not only clinical but also class-
room courses. I point out what I believe are the benefits and the chal-
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lenges of doing so. I believe that the considerable advantages outweigh 
the disadvantages, and more important, many generations of my class-
room students seem to agree.  
In the end, this is a wonderful way to practice law and to teach, 
and I am extraordinarily grateful for having had the opportunity to do 
this for so many years. 
